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R. 16 is the same as Defendant's Exhibit 6 
R. 15 is the same as Defendant's Exhibit 6 
R. 25 is the same as Defendant's Exhibit 19 
R. 30 is the same as Defendant's Exhibit 19 
R. 455 is the same as Defendant's Transcript page 114 
R. 457 is the same as Defendant's Transcript page 116 
R. 506 is the same as Defendant's Partial Transcript page 14 
R. 510-511 is the same as Defendant's Partial Transcript pages 
18 & 19 
R. 521 is the same as Defendant's Partial Transcript page 29 
R. 557 is the same as Defendant's Transcript of Hearing page 11 
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KENNETH F. CLARKE 
MADSEN, JEPSON, SALLENBACK & CLARKE 
Attorney at Law 
One East Center, Suite 300 
P. 0. Box H 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone 801-375-2911 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, COMPLAINT 
v s #
 -7 ^ 
Civil No- (#(£^>T 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
/ 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, and for cause of action against 
the Defendant complains and alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident of Utah 
County, State of Utah and has been for more than three (3) months 
prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife and have 
lived together as such since approximately June of 19 83, and were 
married on June 23, 19 84, at Highland, Utah. 
3. That the Plaintiff is presently pregnant with child of 
the Defendant. 
4. That the care, custody, and control of the child, when 
born, should be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to the right of 
I98li AU3 13 
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the Defendant, to visit the said child at reasonable times and 
places. 
5. That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff cruelly, 
by physically grabbing the Plaintiff and throwing her out of the 
house of the residence of the parties at a time when the Plaintiff 
was pregnant with the child of the Defendant, causing the Plaintiff 
great physical and mental stress and suffering. 
6. That a reasonable sum to be awarded to the Plaintiff 
for the support and maintenance of the said child, when born, 
is $200.00 per month. 
7. That the Defendant be required to pay for all of the 
Plaintiff's medical bills incurred by reason of the birth of the 
said child. 
8. That the Defendant be required to pay all of the medical, 
dental, optical, and other health care expenses for the said child 
during the life of the said child. 
9. That the Plaintiff have confirmed in her all of the right, 
title and interest into a 19 78 GMC 4x4 pick up truck, together 
with living room furniture, brass bed, grand father clock, clothing 
and personal affects and other items that she possessed prior to 
the said marriage. 
10. That the Defendant have confirmed in himself, the 
residence of the parties, together with all other items of personal 
and real property he owned prior to the said living arrangement and 
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marriage. 
11. That the Plaintiff is without sufficient means of 
support to support herself in the manner in which she has been 
accustomed and is without sufficient schooling to obtain 
sufficient funds to maintain herself in the manner in which she 
has been accustomed and that she should be awarded, both as temp-
orary and permanent alimjbny, the sum of $1,000.00 per month for 
the next 24 months to allow her to obtain sufficient education to 
allow herself to support herself in the manner in which she has 
been accustomed to for the past 14 months. 
12. That the Defendant be required to pay the sum of $400.00 
attorney fee's if this matter is not contested; if contested, then 
a reasonable attorney's fee. 
WHEREFORE PLAINTIFF PRAYS for judgment as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff be awarded a divorce from the Defendant. 
2. That the care, custody and control of the child of the 
parties, when born, should be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to 
the right of the Defendant, to vist the said child at reasonable 
times and places. 
3. That the Plaintiff be awarded, for the support and main-
tenance of the said child, when born, $200.00 per month". 
4. That the Defendant be required to pay all of the Plain-
tiff's medical bills incurred by reason of the birth of the said 
child. 
5. That the Defendant be required to pay all of the medical, 
Km/ 
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4. That at the present time, I do have employment at the rate 
of $4.00 per hour, but I have considerable expense in traveling to 
and from/ my net home take is about $640.00 per month. 
5. That until this matter is heard on its merit, I am in need 
of repairs on my automobile; I am told that the engine is about 
ready to go out. 
6. I am presently going to school trying to tjet a better educa-
tion so that I can support myself. That at the present time, I 
do not have sufficient monies to maintain myself. It is an 
extra hardship on me being pregnant at this time and more difficult 
to work. 
7. That for the past 14 months, I have been living in a home 
that is valued at or about $200,000.00. 
8. By reason of a conversation with my husband, I am informed 
that he makes at or about $70,000.00 to $90,000.00 a year. 
9. That during the last 14 months, I have been accustomed to 
a standard of living that I cannot maintain without having my in-
come supplemented in the amount of $1,000.00 per month, until I 
gain an education, which I anticipate I can conclude within two (2) 
years. That the sum of $1,000.00 per month will be a reasonable 
sum to be allowed to me as temporary alimony. 
DATED this day of August, 19 84. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
^%m^ 
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In the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah ^ 
In and For Utah County 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 67,254 
T . DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
DATED December 19, 1984 
Ddadiat I George E. Ball i f JUDGE 
Reported by Myron A. Frazier, C.S.R. 
D I V O R C E 
This was the time set for trial in the above captioned mat-
ter. The plaintiff was present and represented by Kenneth F. Clarke. 
The defendant was present and represented by Gale K. Francis. 
Sylvia Lynn Sherwood was sworn and testified in her own 
behalf and cross-examined. 
Defendant's Exhibit #1 - Grades from School - marked & rec'd. 
Defendant's Exhibit #2 - Grades from School - marked & rec'd. 
Defendant's Exhibit #3 - 1982 Tax Return - marked & rec'd. 
Defendant's Exhibit #4 - 1983 Tax Return - marked & rec'd. 
The witness was examined on redirect examination. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #5 - Repair Order - marked & rec'd. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #6 - Repair Order - marked & rec'd. 
The witness was examined on recross examination. 
Defendant's Exhibit #7 - Doctor Bill - marked, offered, Ob-
jection on the grounds of relevance. Overruled & rec'd. 
Defendant's Exhibit #8 - Doctor Bill - same as above. 
Counsel stipulated that the billing shows the plaintiff has 
incurred $747.00 in attorney's fees and $62.00 costs. 
The plaintiff rests. 
Thomas Daniel Sherwood was 'sworn and testified in his own 
behalf. 
Mr. Clarke objected to the line of questioning relative to 
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first wife. The objection was sustained. The court would order HLA 
testing of all three of the people involved to determine paternity. 
Defendant's Exhibit #9 - 1979 Income Tax Return - marked & rec'd. 
Defendant's Exhibit #10 - 1980 Income Tax Return - marked & rec'd. 
Defendant's Exhibit #11 - 1981 Income Tax Return - marked & rec'd. 
Defendant's Exhibit #12 - 1982 Income Tax Return - marked & rec'd. 
Defendant's Exhibit #13 - 1983 Income Tax Return - marked & rec'd. 
The witness was cross-examined. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #14 - Affidavit - marked and withdrawn 
because the exhibit is in the record. 
The defense rests. 
Counsel for the defendant reserved the issue of paternity. 
The court ordered all three to submit to blood grouping tests 
at the University of Utah Medical Center and have Dr. DeWitt give his 
opinion on the paternity of the child. The defendant is to pay the costs. 
The letter is to be sent to the court and then the court will make an 
order on child support. 
Closing arguments were presented to the court on the issue 
of alimony. Rebuttal arguments were presented by Mr. Clarke. 
The court took the matter under advisement. 
The court made an observation that it would probably make 
an award of alimony for a period of time. If the child is not the de-
fendant's then alimony would terminate. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, Civil No. 67254 
Plaintiff, 
vs. D E C I S I O N 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on the 19th day of December, 
1984, for trial, Kenneth F. Clarke, Esq., appearing for the plaintiff 
and Gale K. Francis, Esq., appearing for the defendant. The parties 
presented their evidence and the Court having taken the matter under 
advisement, now enters its: 
DECISION 
The Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce from the defendant because of his cruel conduct in pushing 
her down on August the 6th, 1984, causing her physical pain and mental 
distress and suffering. 
As to the property matters, each party has that which they 
brought, into the)/.marriage, and neither makes a claim again*: any of 
the other's personal property, nor does the plaintiff claim anything 
as to the defendant's house, which he built and had prior to the 
marriage. 
\fcHp/ 
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The Court finds that the defendant should pay and discharge all 
of the debts incurred during their cohabitation, but prior to the 
parties1 separation, and that each be responsible for those bills 
incurred thereafter. 
Although the parties were only married for forty-five (45) days, 
they lived together for one year prior to their marriage and the Court 
deems that a reaso&ble period of time for the defendant to pay alimony 
to the plaintiff would not exceed twelve months, and Orders that he pay 
her the sum of $250.00 for that period, subject to that sum being 
terminated upon a finding and determination by the Court that the 
defendant is not the father of the child expected to be born in 
February of 1985. The Court will also permit the amount of alimony to 
be reviewed if a determination is made that the defendant is the father 
of the child. 
The Court finds that a reasonable sum for the services of plain-
tiff's attorney in this matter would be the sum of $400.00 for proceed-
ings through the hearing of December 19th, and grants a Judgment in 
favor of plaintiff for the use and benefit of her counsel herein for 
that sum. 
The Court Orders that the alimony herein provided commence as of 
December, 1984, and that payment be made thereon in the sum of $250.00 
forthwith. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare appropriate Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree consistent with the above ai:-l 
foregoing Decision, reserving the issues as above-set forth for re\ j.ov Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Court directed the parties to do upon the birth of the child. 
The Decree of Divorce may become final upon the expiration of 
three months following its signing and entry. 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah, this '2-Q day of December, 198-
-Lt £ ^ GEOkdE E. SALLIF, ^ODGE 
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KENNETH F. CLARKE 
MADSEN, JEPSON, SALLENBACK & CLARKE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
One East Center, Suite 3 00 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 801-375-2911 
pri'i^'-i^ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 67254 
/ 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing this 19th day of 
December, 1984, the Honorable Judge George E. Ballif presiding, 
Kenneth F. Clarke appearing as attorney for the Plaintiff, and 
Attorney Gale K. Francis appearing for the Defendant, and the 
Court having heard the evidence and considered the Stipulation 
of the parties, and the cause having been submitted to the 
Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the 
Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Plaintiff has been for more than three months 
prior to the commencement of this action, a bona fide and acutal 
resident of Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, 
having been married at Highland, Utah on June 23, 1984. 
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3. That the divorce to become final at the expiration of 
90 days from the date of entry of Decree of Divorec in this case. 
4. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to a 
Decree of Divorce from the defendant because of his cruel conduct 
in pushing her down on August the 6th, 1984, causing Ijer physical 
pain and mental distress and suffering. 
5. Although the parties were only married for forty-five 
(45) days, they lived together for one year prior to their mar-
riage and the Court deems that a reasonable period of time for 
the defendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff would not exceed 
twelve months, and Orders that he pay her the sum of $250.00 
for that period, subject to that sum being terminated upon a 
finding and determination by the Court that the defendant is 
not the father of the child expected to be born in February of 
1985. The Court will also permit the amount of alimony to be 
reviewed if a determination is made that the defendant is the 
father of the child. The Court Orders that the alimony herein 
provided commence as of December, 1984, and that payment be 
made thereon in the sum of $250.00 forthwith. 
6. As to the property matters, each party has that which 
they brought into the marriage, and neither makes a claim against 
any of the other's personal property, nor does the plaintiff 
claim any thing as to the defendant's house, which he built and 
had prior to the marriage. 
7. The Court finds that the defendant should pay and dis-
charge all of the debts incurred during their cohabitation, b\it 
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prior to the parties1 separation, and that each be responsible 
for those bills incurred thereafter. 
8. That the plaintiff is presently pregnant and the Court 
reserves the determination of those items in paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 
and 8 of the Complaint on file herein pending the taking of 
blood grouping tests upon the birth of the said child. 
9. The Court finds that a reasonable sum for the services 
of plaintiff's attorney in this matter would be the sum of $400 
for proceedings through the hearing of December 19th, and grants 
a Judgment in favor of plaintiff for the use and benefit of her 
counsel herein for that sum. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to a Decree divorcing 
her from the defendant. 
2. That the Decree provide for the custody of the minor 
children of the parties, payment of child support and alimony 
payments to plaintiff, division of property and debt and visit-
ation rights as set forth in the preceding Findings of Fact. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this (f day of January, 1985, at 
Provo, Utah. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ WaT.T.TP /" HONORABLE GEORGE" "E. 'BALL IF , 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
KENNETH F. CLARKE 
MADSEN, JEPSON, SALLENBACK & CLARKE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
One East Center, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone 801-375-2911 
FILED,..., , .,„,.., 
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V/!iffT/.M F . / ) ' F.M.CLt Hh n 
U \\\wTt/ti 
IN ' 
SYLVIA L.- SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Tir~DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT1 I'OUKT OF UTAH BOUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 67254 
/ 
THE ABOVE :••..; ..„-.. .-. • '. . -; . i -
and trial before the Court, sitting without a jury, on the 1 9 t n 
day of December, 1984, tm ' '* • • >•• • ~.v- : • or-
ney, Kenneth F. Clarke, the Defendant in person and by his attor-
ney, Gale K. Francis, and it appearing to the satisfaction of the 
Court that the Defendant was duly and regularly served, and the 
Stipulation of the parties having been considered and approved 
by the Court, and the Court havmq h< .ml evidence ,md testimony 
and the cause having been submitted, and the Court having duly 
considered the 1 riw and the evidence and the Court having ren-
dered ]t'. decision in wt i.Ling. Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law having been filed and good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Plaintiff is divorced by this Decree from the 
Defendant on the grounds of GREAT MENTAL : 'STRESS, the same to 
become final at t-hp pvnirafinn n,? an ,3-,,^ ^ J_J._ ~C —±-. . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^hiw^ 
this Decree, and the same shall then become final, unless an 
appeal or < >ther proceeding for review is pending before the 
Court before the expiration of said period, or the Court other-
wise orders. 
; |"IINil i-,i<:li ii<ii f v l«",- Mi.i l w h i c h t l .ey h m u q l i ' i n t o Hie 
marriage, and neither makes a claim, against any of the other's 
personal property, nor does the plaintiff claim anything as to 
the defendant's house, which he built and had prior to the mar-
riage. 
3 . . - : . . . a j " :. . t-
debts incurred during their cohabitation, but prior t :. ? ie 
parties' sepera ;• .. ;^-^  i .^  .i- • •---., - s.* 
incurred thereafter. 
4. That a reasonable period of time for the defendant to 
pa} a3 imoi 1} to tl le p] a :i i i t :i if wou] d i lot exceed twelve months, 
and Orders that he pay her the sum of $250.00 for that period, 
subject It :: that sum beinq term i rid tod up* in a f i ndinq <• mid deter-
mination by the Court that the defendant i s not the father of 
the child expected to be born in February of 1985. The, Court 
will also permit I, he amoi n I 1 , of al imony to be reviewed if a det-
ermination is made that the defendant is the father of the child. 
The Court Orders that tl le a ] i mony lie rein provided eormneiiee as < »f 
December, 1984, and that payment be made thereon in the sum of 
$250.00 forthwith. 
So rt ia1 ; ; i reasonable sum for the services of plaintiff's 
attorney in this matter would be the sum of $400.00 for proceed-
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ings through the h i . > 4 *
 ; la-
ment in favor of Plaintiff for the use and benefit ct ner counsel 
heroin for I.hat sum. 
6 I'liat; the plaintiff Is presently pregnant ar^ the Court, 
reserves the determination of those items in paragraphs ; 
7, and 8 of tl le Complaint on fi le her eii 1 pendi ng • ,• -.i* •• * 
blood grouping tests upon the birth of the said child. 
1 I'll. ' ' ' •- rm.nt has issued ai 1 O R D E R TO WITHHOLD AND DEL-
IVER pursuant section 78-45d et a] of the Utah Code, dated the 
day of January, 1985. 
—
 ,rf 
DATED this /f day < January, 1985. 
J ^ 4 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
HONORABLE GEORGE E.'BALLIF 
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J II u i i Wu 
D e c e m b e r 
i- >-. 1 F i f t y 
J a n u a r y , 
^ e H u n d r e d 
• * t h r o u g h 
: i n n n n ) up t o and 
>ecomes f i n a l , and 
a i i d b e n e f i t 
m o n t h s , and o r d e r that ne pay net 
D o l l a r s ( $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 ) f n - *h" m o n t h s 
F e b r u a r y , M a r c h and : . * 
Fi f t y D o l l a r s (*<50. i 
N o v e m b e r , 1 9 8 5 , 
5 • i" IJa s on<\ h I I;I s uHI " the ser v i c ?s of 
P l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y in th i s m a t t e r won I be the sum of Fo u r 
H u n d r e d D o l l a r s ( $ 4 0 0 . 0 0 ) for p r o c e e d i n g s - .Iyil i,,c h e a r i n g of 
D e c e m b e r 1 9 , 1 QQ/* , *<nd n"<* h u n d r e d 
i n c l u d i n g t h e d a t e upo * * t 111 i s ] 
g r a n t s a j u d g v ' I " 1 a :i i \ 
o f her counse l - f * •• i t urn. 
6 , i i s t o dy , a i i d c o i 11: i o I o f t h e : h i 1 d , 
b o r n as is s u e of th i s m a r r i a g e , S h o n t e S h e r w o o d , s h o u l d be 
a w a r d e d to the P l a i n t i f f s u b j e c t to r e a s o n a b l e v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s 
o f t h e D e f e n d a n t • 
7 • 1 h a t a r e a s o n a b l e sum to be a w a r d e d t o P 1 a i n t i f f 
f oi si ipport ar 11 i i i ia i n t e n a n c e of sa i • J c h i 1 d i s 0 n e 1 1i JI id r e d N i n e t y 
Do liars ( $ 1 9 0 . 0 0 ) per m o n t h . 
8 . I hat t h e D e f e n d a n t be r e q u i r e d to pay for a II of 
the P l a i n t i f f ' s m e d i c a l b i l l s i n c u r r e d by r e a s o n of the b i r t h nf 
th e said chi I  d . 
-3-
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d e n t a l , o p t i c a l 
d u r i n g the mi 
DAT ••h 
KJ I J 
X • . - - Hi P tl 1 f d I , 
health care expenses for1 the child 
U ! IJ V- I I l I U « 
rj 
i s tfjday of M^» i Q 8 5 . 
BY IHL COURT: 
rA.-^y 
I Ionoi ab 1 e^iaeori jP I , B«J I d.vf 
Approved as to 
Kenneth F . C l a r k tji, A t t o r n 
VJLP^ P l a i n t i f f 
Gale K . F r a n c il s , A11 o r n e y f o r 
D e f e n d a n t 
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plaintiff has failed to allow and she continues to fail to 
a ] 1 ow def endant 1: 11s i:easonab 1 w r I«'j 111s i> i v J I. i. tatj^n 
I, That in order to assure defendant's rights t: visit 
with the * nieciuard . . i *r-rs oi 
the minor child to remain closely associated with her father, 
defendant petitions the court that paragraph 6 of the amended 
decree be amended to read as : ,ows: 
"That the care, custody, and control of the child, born as 
issue of this marriage, Shonte Sherwood, should be awarded to 
the Plaintiff subject to the following specified minimum rights 
of visitation reserved in the Defendant: every other weekend 
from Saturday 12:00 ofclock noon to Sunday at 6:00 o'clock 
p.m.; on the child1s birthday from 2:00 o'clock p.m. to 6:00 
o'clock p.m.; every other holiday, including New Years Day, 
Lincoln's Birthday, Valentine's Day, Washington's Birthday, 
Easter Sunday, Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day (observed), 
Pioneer Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day (observed), Thanksgiving 
Day, Christmas Eve, Christmas Day from 2:00 o'clock p.m. to 
6:00 o'clock p.m., every Father's Day; two full weeks each 
summer, from Sunday 6:00 o'clock p.m. to the following Sunday 
6:00 o'clock p.m." 
5. vh * ecause of plaintiff's failure to abide by the 
terms and conditions of the amended decree of divorce, 
defendant, .Jiuuld br awarded, hi, cost . -mid it tnmey' u fees 
incurred herein. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays as follows: 
1
 hat paragraph 6 of the amended decree of divorce be 
amended as provided in paragraph 4 hereof. 
"", Thi.it fit? Cendant be awarded his run I and attoi ru.jy' '5 fees 
incurred herein. 
3. For such other further relief as this court deems just 
and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this /£- day of June, 1986. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SMT 
' I 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR, MOC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
55 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
ANSWER TO VERIFIED 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND COUNTER PETITION 
Civil No. fa'73*5<j 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and i ;ei.ly to Defendant's 
Verified Petition replies as follows: 
1. Admit the allegations of Daragraph 1. 
2« Admit the allegations of paragraph 2. 
3. Deny the allegations of Daragrap i, m 
affirmative matter, allege that for one full year after the 
divorce Defendant failed to try and see the child of the 
parties even once. In June of 1985, Plaintiff invited the 
Defendant to the minor child's baptism and that was the first 
time than he had any contact with said child. In March of 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1986, Plaintiff called and invited Defendant to share the 
birthday of the chi Id and Defendant responded approprlately 0 
Plaintiff has invited the Defendant to see the child any time 
t In a l: h e wan L S a n d h a s f u r* t h e i: i n 11 e d h :i n i t o g e I: I: i e t: t e r 
acquainted with the child before thinking about over night 
visitation. The ctiiiu 15 IQ months 01 age and because of the 
failure of the Defendant to associate with the child other than 
as set forth, said child has no acquaintanceship whatsoever 
with her fatt ler 
• -i I)eny * he allegations of ^ragrapt' . * n., as an 
a f f i r in a t i v e 1111 a 1: t ^  • . . • •. •: • - - • t o 
reasonable times and places of visitation which should be as 
follows: Until the child reaches the age of 5 years old, each 
and every Saturday from 9:00 a.m. until 2:00 p.m. Aft^r rh<* 
child reaches the age of 5 years old, every other weekend from 
7:30 - hull rig times of 
visitation child should run ic i *• 1 •* . : babysitters and 
appropriate arrangements should I>e made for the transportation 
of the 1 ') :. 1 H A f t e r r he chi*M ?<? f j v e war?, of age t Defendant 
should I>e entitled to alternating major holidays and a period 
of t: i me I n 1:1: le si l m m e r IIMI t u exci?eil t w o w e e k s . 
S. Deny the allegations of paragraph 5 and as an 
a f f i r m a t i v e matter, allege thai. riaitiLiii uas abided by each 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SmS 
and e v e r v t*Arm iimi c o n d i t i o n of tin1 D e c r e e of D i v o r c e . 
COUNTER PETITION 
P l a i n t i f f alleges and counter p e t i t i o n s the above-
e n t i t l e d Coin:!' ds h.iLlow.s 
1. In the Amended Decree of Divorce, the Defendant was 
ordered to pay the sum of ONE HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS ($190.00) 
per m o n t h as chi 1 d support and since that ti m e there has been a 
substantial change of circumstances K; \ -<ii iaintiff has had 
to c h a n g e I: iei: e m o 1 o y m e i 11: i n or der sufficient funds 
to support h e r s e 1 f a n d t h e m i n o r child o; the parties and the 
child care expense alone exceeds L n e oi:der ed 1: >> t:he 
Defendant for the support of the child. 
2. It is reasonable and appropriate that child support 
be increased I .< > the sun t < >f FC)I IR HUNDRED T W E N T Y FI'VE DOLLARS 
($425.00) per month. 
3 • 11 i s i: e a s or :t a b ] e an d a i: » I D r o p r i a t: e t!: i a t D e f e n d a r I t: I: • e 
ordered to return the bedroom set that was purchased during the 
course of the marriage together with the wedding pictures. 
4. I > a n n r o p r i a t e that the Court 
determine tin^-^ and olaces I visitation w: i should include 
the f o l l o w i n g : Eve r y o I: h e r S a t: i 11: d a y f i " i > in 9 • 0 0 a m . t :> 2 : 0 0 
p.m. until the child reaches the age of 5 years of age. A f t e r 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0859) 
5200 Highland Drive 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 272-2013 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* # * k * * n 
SYLVIA I HHIiHWOOL), 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the defendant, r Daniel Sherwood, i n answer to 
p l a i n t i f f ' s Com n t e r Pet • J . - . . re in , ad i i i l ts , den i e s and 
alleges a ; follows: 
Defendant admits that he was ordered to pay One 
Hundred Ninety Dol lars ($J 90.00) per mon/f :l:i chiJ ci support, 
however, defendant denies each and every other allegation 
c o n t a i n e d :i i I j: > a r a g i: a p h 1 o f p ] a I n t i f ff s c o i i n t e i p e t i + i n n. 
2. Defendant denies the allegations contained ;n 
paragraph 2 of plaintiff's counter petition. 
Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph 3 of plaintifffs counter petition, and furthermore, 
defendant alleges that he pi,: -i. - .: ut •• * - - - >om set prior 
to the marriage to the plaintiff herein. 
•J JUL ! , ; 
"^Sm 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNTER PETITION 
C i v i l No. 
J u d g e : 6?*sy 
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4. Defendant denies that the visitation schedule 
contained in paragraph 4 of plaintiff's counter petition is 
reasonable. Defendant further alleges that, since entry of the 
decree of divorce plaintiff has done everything possible to 
restrict and prevent defendant from exercising his rights of 
visitation with the minor child. 
5. That defendant should be entitled to receive an award 
of his costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays as follows: 
1. That plaintiff's counter petition be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. That defendant be awarded his costs and attorney's 
fees incurred herein. 
3. That the decree of divorce be modified consistent with 
defendant's petition for modification on file herein. 
4. For such other and further relief as the court deems 
just and equitable when so advised. 
Dated this ^ Sfday of July, 1986. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid this Z C^day of July, 1986, to Robert L. 
Moody, attorney for plaintiff, 55 East Center Street, P. 0. Ro>: 
1466, Provo, Utah 84603. 
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RONALD R. STANGER #3074 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
55 East Center Street 
P. 0. Box 477 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, / OBJECTION - REQUEST FOR 
FURTHER HEARING BEFORE 
vs. DISTRICT JUDGE 
DANIEL T. SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. Civil No. 67254 
/ 
On the 6th day of January, 1987 the Commissioner signed 
an Order based upon Defendant's Verified Petition to Modify the 
Decree of Divorce. 
This Objection is timely filed in that it is filed 
within the ten (10) day limitation pursuant to Administrative 
Order No. 24. 
Plaintiff has provided notice to the Commissioner's 
office and to opposing counsel that the recommended Order is 
not acceptable and that further hearing before a District Judge 
is desired. 
Plaintiff specifically objects to the Order for reasons 
including, but not limited to the following: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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OBJECTION 1 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled upon the effect of a 
Decree of Divorce in considering resolution of matters that 
were decided by such Decree in Jacobson v. Jacobson, 703 P.2d 
303, (Utah 1985) the court ruled that a Decree of Divorce is 
res^judicata as to all of the issues raised in the divorce. 
The Decree raised the question of visitation and the court 
cannot disturb such Decree without first determining there has 
been a substantial change of circumstances, making specific 
findings on that fact and specifically find what such changes 
do in the consideration of the welfare of the minor child. 
OBJECTION II 
The Commissioner exceeded his authority in granting 
such amendments because such Order does not find a material 
change of circumstance. Such finding is a threshold question 
required prior to the time that the court hears evidence 
regarding the Petition for Modification. Such findings need to 
be specific and adequate findings of fact and conclusions of 
law as to the change in circumstances relied upon which would 
allow the court to review the Decree (Montoya v. Montoya, 696 
P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985) see also Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 
360, (Utah 1985) and Stettler v. Stettler, P.2d, (Utah 1985). 
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A fair translation of the proffer by both of the 
parties was non-compliance with the Decree. Each party accused 
the other of non-compliance. Non-compliance of the Decree is 
not the proper basis of modifying the Decree. 
OBJECTION III 
The Commissioner does not have the authority to issue a 
final Order; rather, the Commissioners jurisdiction is limited 
to making recommendations to the District Court. 
Plaintiff did not consent to such Order; therefore, the 
Commissioner's jurisdiction is limited to making written 
recommendations. 
Section 30-4.4(2) The court commissioner 
shall, after hearing any motion or other 
application for relief, recommend entry 
of an order, and shall make a written 
recommendation as to each matter heard. 
Should the parties not consent to the 
recommended order, the matter shall be 
referred for further disposition by a 
district judge. 
The authority of the Commissioner is set forth in 
Section 30-3-4.2 which is set forth as follows: 
"The court commissioner may: 
(1 ) require the personal appearance of 
parties and their counsel, upon notice; 
(2) require the filing of financial 
disclosure statements and proposed 
settlement forms by the parties; 
(3) obtain child custody evaluations 
from the Division of Family Services 
or the private sector under Subsection 
55-15b-6(11); 
3 
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1, 
(4) Make recommendations to the court 
regarding any issue in domestic relations 
and spouse abuse cases at any stage of 
proceedings; 
(5) keep records, compile statistics, 
and make reports as the courts may 
direct; 
(6) require counsel for the parties 
to file with the initial or responsive 
pleadings a certificate based upon 
the facts available at that time if 
there is : 
(a) an issue of child custody anticipated: 
(b) a significant financial or property 
issue to be adjudicated; 
(c) legal action pending or previously 
adjudicated, in a district court or a 
juvenile court of any state regarding 
the minor children in the current case. 
It should be noted that Subsection paragraph 4 limits 
the authority of the Commissioner to make recommendations to 
the Court regarding any domestic relation or spouse abuse case 
at any stage of the proceedings. 
The Commissioner without consent to, nor with the 
authority to, made the Order contained in the above-captioned 
file. 
OBJECTION IV 
Defendant's Petition asks for visitation rights to be 
specifically enforced as follows: 
"That the care, custody, and control of the 
child, born as issue of this marriage, Shonte 
Sherwood, should be awarded to the Plaintiff 
subject to the following specified minimum 
rights of visitation reserved in the Defendant: 
every other weekend from Saturday 12:00 o'clock 
A 
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noon to Sunday a t 6:00 o ' c l o c k p .m. ; on the 
c h i l d ' s b i r t h d a y from 2:00 o ' c l o c k p.m. to 
6:00 o ' c l o c k p .m. ; every o t h e r h o l i d a y , 
i n c l u d i n g New Years Day, L i n c o l n ' s B i r t h d a y , 
V a l e n t i n e ' s Day, Washington ' s B i r t h d a y , 
E a s t e r Sunday, Armed Forces Day, Memorial 
Day ( o b s e r v e d ) , P ioneer Day, Labor Day, 
Columbus Day ( o b s e r v e d ) , Thanksgiving Day, 
Chris tmas Eve, Chris tmas Day from 2:00 
o ' c l o c k p.m. to 6:00 o ' c l o c k p . m . , every 
F a t h e r ' s Day; two f u l l weeks each summer, 
from Sunday 6:00 o ' c l o c k p.m. to the fo l low-
ing Sunday 6:00 o ' c l o c k p .m." 
The C o u r t , on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e and w i t h o u t a d e q u a t e 
evidence and wi thou t t h e s e m a t t e r s being r a i s e d in the P e t i t i o n 
r e a d from a w r i t t e n , p r e p a r e d form and o r d e r e d such expanded 
v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s t o D e f e n d a n t beyond t h o s e r e q u e s t e d in t h e 
P e t i t i o n . No ev idence was p r o f f e r e d to suppor t such expanded 
v i s i t a t i o n to Defendant . The fo l l owing i t ems were expanded and 
a r e n o t v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s , r e q u e s t e d i n t h e P e t i t i o n : 
P a r a g r a p h s 1 ( a ) , ( d ) , ( e ) , ( f ) i n c l u d i n g ; a l l t h r e e unnumbered 
p a r a g r a p h s , ( g ) , ( h ) , ( i ) and 2 . 
OBJECTION V 
There was proffered testimony on behalf of Plaintiff 
that she has complied with the original Decree and that any 
failure to exercise visitation rights was because Defendant 
refused and failed to exercise his visitation rights. 
The Defendant proffered contrary testimony. 
The parties did not consent to such proffered testimony 
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and therefore, a hearing before the District Court Judge is 
appropriate pursuant with Administrative Order No. 24 and 
Section 30-3-4.4(3) which state as follows: 
(3) Any party objecting to the recommended 
order or seeking further hearing before a 
district judge shall, within ten days of 
the entry of the commissioner's recom-
mendations, provide notice to the 
commissioner's office and opposing counsel 
that the recommended order is not acceptable 
or that further hearing is desired. The 
commissioner shall then refer the matter 
to a district judge for further hearing, 
conference, or trial. If no objection or 
request for further hearing is made within 
ten days, the party is deemed to have 
consented to entry of an order in conformance 
with the commissioner's recommendation." 
OBJECTION VI 
There is no finding contained in such Order that the 
modification of the Decree regarding visitation rights of 
Defendant takes into consideration the welfare of the child as 
required by UCA, 1953 Section 30-3-5(1) (1984 ed). Walker v. 
Walker 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985) 
ARGUMENT 
Because there was no substantial change of 
circumstances found by the court a hearing should be granted on 
the specific question of whether there was indeed a substantial 
change of circumstance since the Decree
 %which would allow the 
court to disturb the original Decree. 
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The Court cannot exceed the request of the Verified 
Petition of Defendant and make rulings that he deems to be 
appropriate when no notice of such items were provided to 
Plaintiff either in the Petition or any other documents. 
Because no disgression is allowed to either the Commissioner or 
District Court to review this matter, this matter should be 
referred to the appropriate District Court Judge for further 
hearing as provided in Section 30-3-4.4(3). 
The failure of the court to take evidence or to 
specifically find that such changes took into consideration the 
welfare of the child also requires further hearing before the 
District Court. 
DATED this fff^ day of ^Zfij/s/Aks/ ~ J , 1 9 8 7 . 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Utah 
M a i l e d a c o p y of t h e f o r e g o i n g O b j e c t i o n i n an 
l o p e , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t h i s _ ^ § 1 _ _ d a y o f 
'dAAj* , 1987 to: Mr. Nicolaas De Jonge, Attorney 
fenfflant, 
84T17. 
5200 Highland Drive, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
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NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0859) 
Attorney for Defendant 
5200 Highland Drive 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 272-1013 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND MOTION TO AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 67-254 
Judge: 
* * * * * * * 
The defendant, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1) and (6), Rule 
59(e) and Rule 52(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby 
respectfully objects to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law of the Court as they relate to the issue of increasing the 
amount of child support to be paid by defendant in that the 
evidence presented at the time of trial does not prove a 
sufficient change in circumstances to justify an increase in 
child support, and the Court's ruling was an abuse of it's 
discretion* Furthermore, the Court neglected to rule on the 
issue of which of the parties should maintain medical 
insurance, and tax exemption for the minor child, both of which 
issues were presented the time of trial. 
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This Motion is based upon the evidence presented at the 
time of trial, the pleadings and documents, filed herein, and 
defendant's Memorandum of Law filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED this tf day of September, 1987. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Ronald R. Stanger, attorney for plaintiff, 55 East Center 
Street, Provo, Utah 84603, dated this ^ day of September, 
1987. 
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NICOLAAS DE JQNGE (0859) 
Attorney for Defendant 
5200 Highland Drive 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 272-1013 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND MOTION TO AMEND 
Civil No. 67-254 
Judge: Ballif 
* * * * * * * 
Defendant submits this Memorandum in support of his 
objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
this case. Defendants objection is directed to the Court's 
order increasing defendant's obligation for child support from 
$190.00 per month to $390.00 per month. 
Defendant's objection is based on the belief that the 
evidence presented at the time of trial was not sufficient to 
prove as substantial change in circumstances sufficient to 
justify an increase in child support, and that in increasing 
defendant's child support obligation the court abused it's 
discretion. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO JUSTIFY AN INCREASE TN PRTT.n SUPPORT 
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This Court concluded that there was a substantial change 
in circumstances sufficient to order defendant's obligation to 
pay child support be increased from $190.00 per month to 
$390.00 per month, an increase of 110%. The evidence presented 
at the trial, was as follows: 
1. The parties were married for 42 days prior to 
plaintiff instituting divorce proceedings. 
2. Plaintiff's gross income for calendar year 1984 was 
$6,444.00. 
3. Plaintiff's gross income, based on actual earnings for 
calendar year 1987 totaled $17,056.00. 
4. Plaintiff's monthly expense affidavit filed in 
conjunction with the divorce proceedings alleged total monthly 
expenses of $1,462.00. 
5. Plaintiff's monthly expense affidavit contained in her 
Response to Defendant's Interrogatories, filed in conjunction 
with her Petition to Modify, alleged total monthly expenses of 
$1,722.00. 
6. According to defendant's affidavit filed with the 
court at the time of the divorce, defendant's gross draw from 
his business was $2,235.00 per month ($26,820.00 per year), 
which amount was considered by the Court at the time of the 
divorce to determine child support. 
7. Defendant's actual gross income at the time of the 
divorce, however, as evidenced by his Federal Income Tax return 
filed subsequent to the divorce, was $8,733.00 and defendant's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
gross income for calendar year 1986 as evidenced by his Federal 
Income Tax Return was $14,907.00. 
8. At the time of his marriage to plaintiff, defendant 
owned several horses valued at $7,000.00; a 1979 pick-up truck 
valued at $2,500.00; a boat valued at $8,500.00; and a camper 
valued at $2,250.00. 
9. Subsequent to his divorce from plaintiff, defendant 
purchased a BMW automobile, to replace the automobile he had 
been driving. 
10. At the time of the divorce of the parties, defendant 
had debts and obligations totaling in excess of $57,000.00, all 
of which he was ordered to pay and assume in the decree of 
divorce. 
11. As of July 21, 1987, two days prior to the trial in 
this matter, defendant had debts and obligations totaling in 
excess of $104,000.00. 
12. At the time of his marriage and divorce from 
plaintiff, and at the time of the divorce trial herein, 
defendant had, and he continues to have, a support obligation 
to his previous wife for approximately $279.00 per month, plus 
an obligation to pay her state and federal income taxes in the 
amount of approximately $1,200.00 per year. 
In its memorandum decision this Court emphasized the fact 
that in the past, defendant has used his capacity to borrow 
money to maintain and escalate his standard of living. It is 
true that defendant has had to borrow money to pay his bills 
and somewhat maintain his standard of living. However, the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court failed to give any consideration to the fact that the 
borrowed money has to be repaid, thereby presumably 
substantially reducing defendant's standard of living. 
Utah case law requires that a party petitioning the court 
for an increase in child support has the burden to prove a 
substantial and material change in circumstances since entry of 
the decree . Mitchell v. Mitchell, Utah, 668 P.2d 561 (1983). 
The evidence presented by plaintiff in this case does not meet 
that burden. 
Since the divorce plaintiff's gross income from her 
employment has increased from $6,444.00 per year to $17,056.00 
per year, an increase of 165%. During the same period 
plaintiff's alleged expenses have increased $260.00 per month, 
an increase of 18%. 
Defendant's gross annual income for purposes of 
determining child support at the time of the divorce 
($26,820.00), has decreased to $14,907.00, a reduction of 44%. 
During the same period defendant's debts an obligations 
increased from $57,000.00 at the time of the divorce, to 
$104,000.00 at the time of trial, an increase of $47,000.00. 
The evidence is that plaintiff s ability to assist in the 
support of the parties' minor child has increased substantially 
since entry of the amended decree. Plaintiff's income has 
increased 165% while her alledged monthly expenses have 
increased a mere 18%. 
Utah case law holds that both parents have an obligation 
to support their children. Hill v. Hill, Utah, 638 P.2d 516 
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(1981). The Utah Supreme Court has also ruled that child 
support orders should be fashioned not only to the needs of the 
children, but also to the ability of the parent to pay-
Anderson v. Anderson, Utah, 172 P.2d 132 (1946). 
In this case, because Mr. Sherwood's gross income has 
decreased substantially, his ability to pay child support has 
likewise decreased, and therefore does not justify an increase 
in child support at this time. Particularly in light of the 
fact that plaintiff's income has increased so dramatically. 
The disparity in the parties1 income has not changed in such a 
way as to warrant an increase in child support. Gale v. Gale, 
Utah, 258 P2d 986 (1953). Although there has been a 
substantial reduction in the disparity of income since entry of 
the decree of divorce, based on the respective parties1 present 
ability to support the minor child, rather than warranting an 
increase in support, the evidence justifies a reduction in 
support. 
In its memorandum decision the Court placed great deal of 
emphasis on the fact that the defendant owns a boat, some 
horses, a 19 79 pick-up truck and a camper. The evidence was 
that the defendant owned all of these items of personal 
property, including the home in which he and his present wife 
reside, prior to his marriage to the plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the Court, in acknowledging defendant's 
obligation for alimony under a previous decree of divorce, 
seems to suggest that because defendant's former wife has not 
made formal demand for arrearages due her, that fact should 
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somehow impact on the issue increasing the amount of child 
support. The defendant had that obligation at the time of his 
divorce from plaintiff, and it remains a Court ordered 
obligation this day. 
The items of personal property enumerated by the Court as 
well as the previous decree of divorce were considered by this 
Court at the time of entry of the original decree of divorce 
herein, and are res judicata in so far as these proceedings are 
concerned. They should have no bearing whatever on the issue 
of whether there has been a substantial and material change in 
circumstances sufficient to warrant an increase in child 
support. This Court can and should consider only evidence not 
originally contemplated in the original decree . Kessimakis 
v. Kessimakis, Utah, 580 P.2d 1090 (1978). 
The evidence presented at the trial, was insufficient to 
conclude that there had been a substantial and material change 
in circumstances sufficient to increase defendant's level of 
child support. Even the Uniform Child Support Schedule, which 
is generally accepted as a guide to child support, shows that 
based on defendant's current gross monthly income of $1,242.00, 
he would normally be expected to pay child support of $135.00. 
The Court ordered level of $390.00 places defendant in the 
$3,500.00 per month income category. The evidence does not 
substantiate such a conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully urges that the Court was in error 
in its increased award for child support, that the order does 
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not conform to the evidence presented at the trial, and that 
such a result is an abuse of discretion which should be 
corrected by the Court at this time. 
DATED this 9th day of September, 1987. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to Ronald R. Stangerf attorney for plaintiff/ 55 East Center 
Street, Provo, Utah 84603f this m£f day of September, 1987. 
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RONALD R. STANGER #3074 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
80 East 100 North 
P. 0. Box 477 
Provo, UT 84603 
(801) 375-5010 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION 
vs. TO FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW t* 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, MOTION TO AMEND 
Defendant. Civil No. 67,254 
. / 
Plaintiff hereby enters the following Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Objection. 
POINT I 
Such O b j e c t i o n does no t conform w i t h t h e Ru les of t h e 
above-cap t ioned cou r t and such Objec t ion was not t imely f i l e d . 
POINT I I 
A r e a d i n g of t h e Memorandum f i l e d by D e f e n d a n t , does 
no t c o n t a i n any s u b s t a n t i a l m a t t e r s t h a t were no t r a i s e d and 
argued a t t r i a l . 
POINT I I I 
Rule 59 (e) is not applicable because a judgment has 
not been signed in this matter. 
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POINT IV 
Rule 52 (b) i s no t a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a u s e t h e amendment 
s t a t e s t h a t such p r o c e d u r e i s t o be used ". . . a f t e r e n t r y of 
j u d g m e n t . . ." There has no t been a j u d g m e n t s i g n e d in t h i s 
m a t t e r . 
POINT V 
R u l e 59 ( a ) ( 1 ) r e q u i r e s t h a t t h i s c o u r t f i n d t h e 
fo l l owing : 
"(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of 
the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of 
discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial" 
POINT VI 
The Court will recall this matter went on for two (2) 
days and Defendant raised all of the matters set forth in his 
"Objection11 and just because the court did not agree with the 
position of Defendant, does not grant to the Defendant any 
remedy under Rule 59 (a)(1). 
POINT VII 
R u l e 59 ( a ) (6) r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e C o u r t f i n d a s 
f o l l o w s : 
f,(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law." 
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POINT VIII 
There was s u b s t a n t i a t i v e evidence provided by the court 
which i s s e t f o r t h wi th g r e a t s p e c i f i c i t y in the c o u r t ' s 
wr i t ten dec i s ion . 
POINT IX 
• ii •!•• ii • m < » n < n • i 
The opposing party does not claim that the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Second Amended 
Decree of Divorce varied from the written decision signed by 
the court. 
POINT X 
It should be noted that the court ruled on behalf oi 
Defendant in certain matters, namely, extended visitation and 
contempt and ruled in partial support of Defendant's position 
in regards to child support. 
POINT XI 
The tax exemption question is a matter for the Internal 
Revenue Service and Plaintiff would argue that the current law 
is that regardless of what the court would order the custodial 
parent must sign a waiver each and every year in order for 
Defendant to obtain any tax relief. 
POINT XII 
Plaintiff would argue that the medical insurance 
question has been taken care of and the court is not requirerl 
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to set forth a ruling on each and every matter and therefore, 
the medical insurance is to remain in the status quo unless the 
court orders to the contrary. 
ARGUMENT 
The proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the proposed Second Amended Decree of Divorce conforms with 
the written decision of the court and therefore, such documents 
should be signed by the court. 
The court set forth in great detail the facts, evidence 
and reasons for the court's decision. There is nothing set 
forth in Defendants argument that there was new evidence 
discovered, etc. 
All of the figures used by the court are not objected 
to by Defendant. 
The Supreme Court has ruled on every occassion that the 
trial court has the disgression to believe one party against 
another, one set of facts as against the other. In this matter 
the court had sufficient evidence, facts and reason to rule in 
the manner it did and Defendant has not set forth any reasons, 
facts or evidence to justify the Objection filed by Defendant. 
Plaintiff would argue that the court's ruling in 
regards to child support was reasonable for all of the reasons 
set forth by the court which include, but is not limited to, 
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the evidence that the increased support was substantially equal 
to the car payment for the new BMW car that Defendant had the 
ability to purchase. 
The court had sufficient evidence and facts to show 
that there had been a substantial change of circumstances. 
Plaintiff would further argue that Defendant is 
desirous of re-trying the case before the court. Rules 59 and 
52 do not grant that right to the Defendant and Defendant has 
not set forth facts to show that the court abused its 
disgression in this matter. 
THEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the 
court sign the appropriate documents as prepared by Plaintiff. 
The wording of which was consistent with the court's decision. 
lis day of
 |y<^/fc^^> DATED th: , 1987. 
R. STAf 
ley for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of t h e fo rego ing Memorandum in Oppos i t i on 
.n e n v e l o p e , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t h i s ,_.ZJ$(^_ d a y of 
J ^ , 1987 t o : Mr. N i c o l a a s De~Jo~ne~e, A t t o r n e y 
'Defeoda"nt7~32d0 Highland Dr ive , S u i t e 300, S a l t Lake C i t y , 
UT 84117. 
:rejcary 
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RONALD R. STANGER #3074 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
80 East 100 North 
P. 0. Box 477 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-5010 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
P l a i n t i f f , FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v s . 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
D e f e n d a n t . C i v i l No. 67254 
/ 
T h i s m a t t e r c a m e b e f o r e t h e c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o 
o b j e c t i o n s f i l e d t o t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n o f t h e D o m e s t i c 
R e l a t i o n s C o m m i s s i o n e r and based upon t h e a p p l i c a t i o n * - C o u n t e r 
P e t i t i o n of t h e P l a i n t i f f f o r an i n c r e a s e in c h i l d s u p p o r t . 
The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e r e a r e o n l y two (2) 
s p e c i f i c i s s u e s f o r t h i s c o u r t t o d e c i d e i n a d d i t i o n t o 
a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and c o n t e m p t , t h e y a r e : (1) an e x t e n d e d 
s u m m e r v i s i t a t i o n , i f a n y and (2) w h e t h e r m a t e r i a l c h a n g e of 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s h a v e o c c u r r e d t o w a r r a n t t h e c o u r t t o d e c i d e 
w h e t h e r o r no t an i n c r e a s e in c h i l d s u p p o r t s h o u l d be a l l o w e d . 
The c o u r t h e a r d e v i d e n c e and a r g u m e n t f rom e a c h p a r t y 
and each p a r t y s u b m i t t e d T r i a l B r i e f s , d o c u m e n t s , and e x h i b i t s . 
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After reviewing the same, the court took this matter 
under consideration. 
After deliberation and the court being fully advised in 
the premises, the court finds the following facts: 
CONTEMPT 
1. The court finds that the Plaintiff has acted in a 
manner which has caused negative reactions in the child to the 
Defendant and in so doing, has made the visitations Defendant 
has pursued somewhat difficult. Although it appears that 
Defendant has handled the negative reactions of the child in a 
way in which they could have been quickly overcome. 
EXTENDED VISITATION 
2. The court finds on the basis of the visitation that 
the Defendant has been receiving with the child and the fact 
that he has a new wife and can provide appropriate care for 
extended periods an extended visitation should be allowed to 
Defendant on the following basis: 
(a) For the balance of the summer of 1987, one (1) 
week in August. 
(b) Two (2) one (1) week visitations during the summer 
of 1988. The last visitation day of the first week to be at 
least thirty (30) days prior to the second week. 
(c) Same as above for 1989 and 1990. 
2 
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(d) Thereafter until otherwise ordered two (2) 
visitations of two (2) weeks duration each during the summer, 
the last visitation to begin not less than thirty (3U) days 
after the last visitation of the first session. 
(e) The parties may vary the aforesaid schedule if 
mutually agreed between them both as to time and duration 
provided such change is in writing and so acknowledged by each 
party, 
CHILD SUPPORT 
3. The court finds that at the time the parties were 
divorced in January of 1985, the Defendant had apparently-
secured a job with Utah Transit Authority and although she only 
received Six Thousand Four Hundred and Forty-Four Dollars 
($6,444.00) in wages in 1984, in 1985 she received Twelve 
Thousand Ninety Dollars ($12,090.00) in wages plus Three 
Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($3,650.00) in alimony. 
4. At the present time she is earning approximately 
Four Hundred and Eighty-Nine Dollars ($489.00) net every two 
(2) weeks for a total of Seventeen Thousand Fifty Six Dollars 
($17,056.00) gross per year. 
5. The court finds that there has been an increase in 
her monthly expenses for transportation and child care but the 
overall differences between increased expenditures an<i 
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increased income show an increased need tor a little less 
increase to income to meet the need. 
6. The court further finds that the Defendant, who is 
a CPA, presents a picture of an escalating standard of livinn 
as shown by heavy expenditures in the area such as travel, 
motor vehicles, many purchases with credit lines and loans to 
himself individually and his loans to his business. All of 
which creates a suspect diminution in income since the divorce; 
however, the court finds that the ability to maintain a 
standard of living appears to have been enhanced since the 
parties were divorced. 
7. Evidence was introduced that the Defendant has 
alimony and other obligations to a prior wife and that no 
action by his former wife has been filed to enforce collection 
of such sums. 
8. The court received evidence in Defendants exhibit 
#34 that he lists among other items as assets, horses valued at 
Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) a 198b BMW valued at Twenty-
One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($21,500.00) and a 1979 
pickup truck valued at Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($2,500.00) and a boat valued at Eight Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($8,500.00) and a camper valued at Two Thousand Two 
Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($2,250.00). On the liability and 
\J 
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equity side, Defendant lists debts to Republic Brink card for 
over One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) Valley Bank and Trust, 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) ComiDercial Security Bank 
nearly Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) Commercial Security 
Bank for Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) and Commercial-
Security Bank for nearly Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) 
and a Nineteen Thousand Dollar ($19,000.00) mortgage to Western 
Mortgage and Legacy Financial. 
9. The court further finds that the earning capacity 
of Defendant showed an adjusted gross income of Eight Thousand 
Seven Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars ($8,733.00) in 1983. 
10. The Defendant's adjusted gross income in 1986 
shows an adjusted gross income of Fourteen Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Seven Dollars ($14,907.00). 
11. The court finds that the debts of Defendant appear 
to have greatly increased over that period of time. 
12. The court finds that the Defendant has continued 
to increase his standard of living and is spending substantial 
sums for his comfort and enjoyment, automobiles, boats, travel, 
etc. 
13. The court further finds that Defendant's adjusted 
gross income has nearly doubled although his debt has 
increased. 
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ATTORNEY FEES 
14. The court finds that each party should bear their 
own costs and attorney fees in this matter, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
• •i n m » . « » « i i » i n i i i . • • • • • • • • • i ^ i • • • • • • 
Based upon t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e c o u r t , t h e c o u r t 
concludes as a ma t t e r of law the fo l l owing : 
CONTEMPT 
1. The court hereby orders that the issue ot contempt 
be stayed for a period of six (6) months and if brought back 
before the court by the Defendant on a Petition, at that time 
will review the performance of Plaintiff in so far as it 
relates to the visitation and whether she attempts any further 
negative influences toward the Defendant by the child and at 
that time, may take appropriate action. Otherwise, at the end 
of such time, any further consideration of contempt will be 
permanently suspended. 
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
2. The court further concludes that there has been a 
material change of circumstances regarding child support and 
that the Defendant is capable of contributing more to the 
support of his minor child in the care and custody of the 
Plaintiff and that particularly the need of the Defendant at: 
this time for assistance in the paying of child care so she can 
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discharge her responsibilities to her employer and continue to 
earn money to help sustain herself and the child and the fact 
that there has been increased needs for the child since the 
divorce* 
CHILD SUPPORT 
3. The court concludes that such child support should 
be increased Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) such amount beinu 
concluded by the court to be reasonable, therefore, the total 
child support is Three Hundred Ninety Dollars ($390.00). 
ATTORNEY FEES 
4. The court concludes that each party should bear 
their own costs and attorney fees in this matter. 
5. The court further concludes that the Divorce Decree 
should be amended to reflect the matters set forth in tho 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this / £r" day of ^ ^^^J^^^^jlj— , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
GEORGE 
\£^0£^^ 
BALLIF, JudRer 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
NICOLAAS D.E JONGE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in an envelope, postage prepaid, this 
day of //Wfy/.W' , 1987 to: Mr. Nicolaas De 
I U »» M' '»•' »• |i 
Jonge, Attorney for Defendant, 5200 Highland Drive, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117. 
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RONALD R. STANCER #3074 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
80 East 100 North 
P. 0. Box 477 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-5010 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Ob UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, SECOND AMENDED DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
D e f e n d a n t . C i v i l No. 67^54 
m _ . _ / 
T h i s m a t t e r came on f o r h e a r i n g on t h e 3 0 t h day of 
J u l y , 1987 f o r t h e a m e n d i n g of t h e Amended D e c r e e of D i v o r c e 
s i g n e d by t h e H o n o r a b l e George E. B a l l i f on t h e 5 t h day of May, 
1 9 8 5 . 
F i n d i n g s o f F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Lav; h a v i n g b e e n 
f i l e d and good c a u s e a p p e a r i n g , t h e c o u r t e n t e r s t h i s S e c o n d 
Amended Dec ree of D i v o r c e . 
CONTEMPT 
1. The c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f h a s a c t e d i n a 
manner which has c a u s e d n e g a t i v e r e a c t i o n s in t h e c h i l d t o t h e 
D e f e n d a n t and i n s o d o i n g , h a s made t h e v i s i t a t i o n s D e f e n d a n t 
h a s p u r s u e d s o m e w h a t d i f f i c u l t . A l t h o u g h i t a p p e a r s t h a i 
D e f e n d a n t has h a n d l e d t h e n e g a t i v e r e a c t i o n s of t h e c h i l d in >\ 
\xi H\T i n r . i h i n h t -K/^iT / I A M ! ^ U « r » ^ U ~ ^ .-* -: ^ i _ i _ - _ . _ 
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MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
2. The court further orders that such Decree be 
amended because of the finding of the court that there has been 
a material change of circumstances. 
EXTENDED VISITATION 
3 . T h e c o u r t h e r e b y o r d e r e s p a r a g r a p h 6 of s u c h 
Amended Decree i s h e r e b y amended t o r e a d a s f o l l o w s : 
The c a r e , c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l o f t h e c h i l d , b o r n a s 
i s s u e of t h i s m a r r i a g e , S h o n t e Sherwood , s h o u l d be awarded to 
P l a i n t i f f . D e f e n d a n t i s h e r e b y a w a r d e d t h e t o 1 l o w i n g 
v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s : 
( a ) E v e r y o t h e r w e e k e n d f rom F r i d a y e v e n i n g a t 6 : 0 0 
p .m. t o Sunday e v e n i n g t o 6 :00 p .m. 
(b) The Defendan t s h a l l have t h e c h i l d on F a t h e r ' s Day 
and h i s b i r t h d a y . 
( c ) Every o t h e r n a t i o n a l h o l i d a y and t h e 24 th of J u l y . 
(d ) From 1:00 p.m. t o 6 : 0 0 p.m. on C h r i s t m a s Day and 
t w o (2) d a y s and n i g h t s d u r i n g t h e C h r i s t m a s h o l i d a y a f t e r 
December 2 6 t h . 
(e) For e x t e n d e d p e r i o d s , v i s i t a t i o n s h o u l d be a l l o w e d 
on t h e f o l l o w i n g b a s i s : 
( i ) F o r t h e b a l a n c e of t h e summer of 1 9 8 7 , One 
(1) week i n A u g u s t . 
( i i ) Two (2 ) o n e - w e e k (1 ) v i s i t a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
summer of I98tf, t h e l a s t v i s i t a t i o n day o t t h e t i r s t week t o b»* 
a t l e a s t 30 days p r i o r t o t h e second week. 
( i i i ) Same a s above f o r 1989 and 1990. 
( i v ) T h e r e a f t e r , u n t i l o t h e r w i s e o r d e r e d two (2) 
v i s i t a t i o n s of two (2) weeks d u r a t i o n each d u r i n g t h e summer, 
t h e s e c o n d v i s i t a t i o n t o b e g i n n o t l e s s t h a n t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) d a y s 
a f t e r t h e l a s t v i s i t a t i o n day of t h e f i r s t s e s s i o n . 
( f ) The P l a i n t i f f s h a l l have t h e c h i l d on M o t h e r ' s Day 
and h e r b i r t h d a y . 
The p a r t i e s may v a r y t h e a f o r e s a i d s c h e d u l e i t 
m u t u a l l y a g r e e d b e t w e e n them b o t h a s t o t i m e and d u r a t i o n 
p r o v i d e d such change i s i n w r i t i n g and so acknowledged , by each 
p a r t y . 
(g) A l l v i s i t a t i o n p e r i o d s s h a l l be e x e r c i s e d in a 
p r o m p t m a n n e r s o t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s c a n make t h e i r p l a n s 
a c c o r d i n g l y . The n o n - c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s h a l l p i c k t h e c h i l d up 
f rom t h e f r o n t s t e p s o f t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t ' s r e s i d e n c e no 
e a r l i e r t h a n f i f t e e n ( 1 5 ) m i n u t e s p r i o r and no l a t e r t h a n 
f i f t e e n (15 ) m i n u t e s a f t e r t h e v i s i t a t i o n p e r i o d c o m m e n c e s . 
R e t u r n o f t h e c h i l d t o t h e f r o n t s t e p s o f t h e c u s t o d i a l 
p a r e n t ' s r e s i d e n c e s h a l l a l s o be s u b j e c t t o t h e f i f t e e n (15) 
m i n u t e r u l e . The c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t s h a l l have t h e c h i l d t e d and 
r e a d y on t i m e f o r v i s i t a t i o n w i t h s u f f i c i e n t c l o t h i n g p a c k e d 
and r e a d y f o r t h e v i s i t a t i o n p e r i o d . 
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In the event the child is ill or otherwise unable to 
visit, a make-up visitation will be allowed to the non-
custodial parent on the next succeeding weekend. However, if 
the non-custodial parent fails for any reason not to exercise 
his visitation for reasons of his health or for any other 
reason, there will be no make-up visitation period. 
The child will not be permitted to determine whether 
she wishes to visit with the non-custodial parent. Personal 
plans of the custodial parent or child, school activities, 
church activities, or other consideration will not be reasons 
for failing to adhere to the visitation schedule set forth 
herein. Only substantial medical reasons will be considered 
sufficient for postponement of visitation. 
(h) Both parties will provide addresses and contact 
telephone numbers for both home and their employment to the 
other party and will immediately notify the other of any 
emergency circumstances or substantial changes in the health of 
the child. 
(i) The non-custodial parent shall, in addition to the 
visitation set forth, have the unlimited right to correspond 
with the minor child of the parties and to telephone the minor 
child during reasonable hours without interference of 
monitoring by the custodial parent or anyone else in any way. 
Unless otherwise agreed to between the parties, telephone 
conferences between the non-custodial nar^nr *n,i nh\\n r,K.,ii u~ 
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limited to no more than one per week and shall be, in total, 
fifteen (15) minutes or less in duration. 
(j) Both parties are restrained from making derogatory 
comments about the other party or in any other way diminishing 
the love, respect, and affection that the child has for either 
party. 
4. Paragraph 7 of such Amended Decree is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
The the previous sum of support arid maintenance of 
said child in the amount of One Hundred Ninety Dollars 
($190.00) be increased Two Hundred Dollars (520U.00) making a 
total support payment of Three Hundred Ninety Dollars 
($390.00) commencing September 1, 1987. 
5. Except as specifically amended, the balance of such 
Amended Decree shall remain in full force and effect. 
, o^ 
DATED this / # day of 
BY THE COURT: 
1987 
G EORG E LiVBALL IF, J ud a e 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
NICOLAAS DE JOHGE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
M a i l e d a copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g Second Amended Decree of 
D i v o r c e i n an e n v e l o p e , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t h i s _ 2 ^ 1 ™ . . d a y oi: 
¥//£<£ - » 1987 t o : Mr. N i c o l a a s De J o n e e , 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t , 5200 H i g h l a n d D r i v e , S u i t e 3 0 0 , S a l t 
Lake C i t y , UT 84117, 
a f y 
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RONALD R. STANGER 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
UNITED SURETY BUILDING 
80 EAST 100 NORTH - P.O. BOX 477 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 ; " v (801) 375-5010 
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;.;-;';^';-. :' October- 22 , 1987 
l i r . f i ico laas De Jon^e 
Attorney at Lav; 
52U0 Highland Drive, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
HE: Sherwood vs. Sherwood 
Dear lir, De Jonget 
• . > 
Enclosed is a copy of the proposed Findings of Fact 4* 
Conclusions of Law and Second Attended Decree of Divorce. 
Pursuant to Rule 2.V, 1 will not submit these documents to 
the court for a period of five days in order to allow you the 
opportunity to object to such documents. 
Hay 1 respectfully surest that if you have any tunuestions 
that you call me or write roe a letter setting forth exactly 
what you think the court stated. 
For your information, 1 have reviewed the original Decree of 
Divorce and there wac not an affidavit received into -evidence 
to show any draws, etc. as sun^ested by your Exhibit #19. 
Because that Affidavit was not received into evidence, I did 
not believe it x:as appropriate to include such tacts in the 
enclosed documents. 
As you will recall, the court requested that I review the 
rile to see if the Affidavit had been received into evidence at 
the original hearing. 1 air< enclosing, for your information, a 
list of the exhibits which shows that the Defendant oic not 
introduce any Affidavit. 
If ycu have any questions, please reel free to contact ae. 
Very triily/yours
 f 
•
r % 
l-.ri J j ; ' f R. 'h'L.ixi... 
i ' . t r . J r r n H Vit [>.-.. 
LWn-owo 
.. "ic icsur«? 
- c : S y l v i a 
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„-- ^ .v.r.ili-H 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
******* 
******** 
RULING 
Case Number CV 87 254 
Dated November 23, 1987 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
The defendant's objections to the Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Decree are 
overruled, and the same are herewith entered in this matter. The 
courts direction to counsel for plaintiff at the October 2, 1987 
hearing have been complied with and any other objections of 
defendant are overruled and the Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Second Amended Decree are entered. 
Dated this ^ 3 . day of November, 1987 
GEORGE (Z. BALLIF, JUD6 
S 
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Kt.'v . . ..., 
RONALD R. STANGER #3074 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
80 East 100 North 
P. 0. Box 477 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-5010 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, ORDER 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Judge: Ceorge E. Ballif 
Defendant. Civil No. 67254 
/ 
• y * ' " 1 »•'••' 
This m a t t e r came before the Court for Oral Arguments on 
D e f e n d a n t ' s O b j e c t i o n t o B i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of 
Law and Motion to Amend. The P l a i n t i f f appea r ing in person and 
r e p r e s e n t e d by Ronald R. S t a n g e r . The D e f e n d a n t a p p e a r i n g in 
person and r e p r e s e n t e d by Nico laas De Jonge . 
Each p a r t y , through t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n s e l , p re sen ted 
t h e i r arguments to the Court* 
Mr. De J o n g e p r e s e n t e d a r g u m e n t s on t h e i s s u e of a 
m a t e r i a l change of c i r c u m s t a n c e and a r g u e d to t h e Cour t to 
r e c o n s i d e r the amount of c h i l d s u p p o r t . 
Mr. De Jonge f u r t h e r argued t h a t the Court should r u l e 
on t h e q u e s t i o n of h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e and which p a r t y shoulci 
claim the minor for income tax p u r p o s e s . 
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Mr. Stanger argued that circumstances had changed so as 
to constitute a material change of circumstance. 
Mr. Stanger further argued that the question of health 
insurance and who should claim the minor child was not raised 
in the pleadings and therefore argued that the Court should not 
make any order with respect to those items. 
After hearing the argument of counsel, the Court 
determined that it had found a material change of circumstance 
and directed Mr. Stanger to file Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce setting forth such 
matters. 
DATED this <?3 day of T^.^t^e.c^kj^ 1987, 
BY THE COURT: 
^Ssfet^i 
GEORGE V. BALLIF, Jud 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Order in an envelope, 
postage prepaid, this ^ Z ^ day of J^0^^j , 1987 
to: Mr. Nicolaas De Jonge, Attorney f or " Def encfan t, 5200 
Highland Drive #300, Salt Lake City, Ut 84117. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
Case Number 67254 
Dated January 12, 1908 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
* • • * • • * • 
MINUTE ENTRY 
In the hearing on the Objections of the Defendant to 
the Findings and Decree the court made it's final ruling from the 
bench and instructed counsel for the plaintiff to prepare an 
Amended Judgment and Order on Objections to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
The Ruling of November 23, 1987 is definitive as to 
disposition of Defendant's Objections. 
If counsel did not get notice of the ruling dated 
November 23, 1987 it is suggested that counsel apply for relief 
as provided at Rule 4 (e) of Court of Appeals Rules. 
Dated this / ? day of January, 1988. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l^p> \mJ 
IT; • •:, 
! '; 
, , . , , 
NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0859) 
Attorney for Defendant 
5200 Highland Drive 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 272-1013 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
) MOTION TO VACATE PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND SECOND 
) AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE; 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS 
) OF FACT AND SECOND AMENDED 
DECREE AND MOTION FOR 
) CLARIFICATION OF RULING. 
) Civil No. 67254 
) Judge: George E. Ballif 
* * * * * * * 
Comes now the defendant, by and through his counsel of 
record and hereby moves the court to vacate the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Amended Decree of 
Divorce entered herein, for the reason that until January 6, 
1988, defendant's counsel had no knowledge that the Court, on 
November 23, 1987, entered its Ruling on oral arguments on 
defendant's previous objection argued in open court on October 
2, 1987. Furthermore, until January 6, 1987, counsel for 
defendant had no knowledge that the court, on November 23, 
1987, signed and entered the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Decree of Divorce, the 
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same date as the Court's ruling. 
That by doing so, and by failing to notify counsel of it's 
Ruling, the court has denied defendant both an opportunity to 
object to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Second Amended Decree of Divorce and to appeal it's 
decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Furthermore, defendant objects to the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law and Second Amended Decree of Divorce 
in that they are grossly inadequate and do not adequately 
reflect either the evidence presented at the time of trial nor 
do they adequately reflect the basis for the Courts ruling in 
this matter. 
Furthermore, defendant moves the Court for clarification 
of it's ruling in that the Court failed to rule on the issue of 
award of the income tax exemption and the issue relatin to 
which of the parties should maintain health, accident and 
dental insurance for the minor child of the parties. 
In addition, defendant moves the Court for an award for 
his costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
Dated this 12th day of January, 1988. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
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NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0859) 
Attorney for Defendant 
5200 Highland Drive 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 272-1013 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO VACATE PROPOSED 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS AND AMENDED DECREE; 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS 
VS. ) AND CLARIFICATION OF RULING 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, ) Civil No. 67254 
Defendant. ) Judge: George E. Ball if 
* * * * * * * 
Defendant submits this memorandum in support of his MOTION 
TO VACATE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND AMENDED DECREE: OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS and CLARIFICATION OF RULING entered on 
November 23, 19 87. 
I 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Proposed Findings and 
Amended Decree is based on the pleadings on file herein and on 
the fact that the court entered the proposed Findings and 
Decree without giving counsel an opportunity to appropriately 
respond. 
On November 23, 1987, without notice to counsel for the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Motion 
to Amend which had been argued in open court on October 2, 
1987. On the same day, November 23, 1987, without notice to 
counsel for the defendant, and over the objections filed by 
counsel for the defendant, the court signed and entered the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Decree of Divorce. 
The Court's failure to so advise counsel of it's Ruling 
and entry of the Findings and Amended Decree has effectively 
deprived defendant of his right to appeal itfs decision to the 
Utah Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II 
Defendant's Objection to content of the Proposed Findings 
and Amended Decree is based on the fact that the documents as 
prepared and filed with the Court are legally insufficient and 
do not adequately or properly set forth the evidence presented 
in this matter at the time of trial, nor do they accurately 
reflect the basis for the Court's decision in this matter. 
Due to the failure of the Court to advise counsel of entry 
of it's Ruling, and the proposed Findings and Amended Decree, 
defendant has been deprived of his right to object to the 
contents of the Findings and Amended Decree as provided in Rule 
2.9 of the Rules of Practice. 
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In the case of Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986) our Supreme Court ruled that "Findings of Fact must show 
that the Court's judgment or decree follows logically from and 
is supported by the evidence.11 In Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979) our Supreme Court held that "Findings should 
be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached." The proposed Findings and Amended 
Decree are seriously deficient in that regard. Much of the 
pertinent financial information presented at the time of the 
trial has been omitted. 
Many of the comparisons of the parties1 financial 
information at the time of the divorce and at the time of the 
hearing has been omitted from the proposed Findings. Much of 
the information relating to income and expense comparisons as 
well as defendant's debt structure have been omitted. 
Furthermore, the basis for the court's decision in this 
matter has not been adequately set forth. In Acton v. Deliran, 
737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) our Supreme Court stated in part 
that "findings should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached". The 
proposed Findings of Fact are seriously deficient in that 
regard and the Court should order that they be revised 
accordingly. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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At the time of the trial, and in conjunction with the 
issue of child support, evidence was presented relating to the 
issue as to which of the parties should be allowed to claim the 
minor child as an exemption for State and Federal tax purposes. 
Furthermore, because plaintiff has complete insurance coverage 
available to her through her employer, defendant requested a 
ruling as to which of the parties ought to be primary provider 
for health, medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the 
minor child. In both it's initial ruling dated August 11, 
1987, and it's most recent ruling, dated November 23, 1987, the 
Court failed to rule on these issues. Defendant requests that 
the Court enter a ruling on these matters, and that they be 
incorporated into the Findings and Amended Decree of Divorce. 
Defendant requests that the Court vacate the Findings and 
Amended Decree of Divorce entered herein; that plaintiff's 
counsel be instructed to prepare Findings and Amended Decree of 
Divorce both factually and legally sufficient to reflect the. 
Court's ruling in this matter; and that the Court amend it's 
Ruling to decide the issue of tax exemption and medical and 
dental insurance as previously requested. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 1988. 
m 
Attorney foi^'Defendant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
this 12th day of January, 19 88, to Ronald R. Stanger, attorney 
for Plaintiff, 80 East 100 North, Provo, Utah 84603. 
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NICOLAAS DE JONGE (0859) 
Attorney for Defendant 
5200 Highland Drive 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 272-1013 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NICOLAAS 
DE JONGE 
Civil No. 67254 
Judge: George E. Ballif 
* * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW Nicolaas de Jonge and being first duly sworn 
deposes and says: 
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah, and that I am attorney of record for T. Daniel 
Sherwood. 
2. That on January 6, 1988, affiant received, from the 
clerk of the Court, a copy of the Court's ruling of the hearing 
held on October 2, 198 7, which ruling was dated November 23, 
1987. In addition, on January 6, 1988, affiant received 
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signed copies of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Second Amended Decree of Divorce in the above- sititled matter. 
3. That January 6, 19 88, when affiant received the 
Court's ruling and the accompanying Findings of Fact and 
Amended Decree of Divorce, that was the first time affiant had 
received any documentation of the Court's ruling in this 
matter. Furthermore, it was the first time affiant was made 
aware that the Court had entered the proposed Findings of Fact 
and Second Amended Decree of Divorce. 
Further affaint sayeth not. 
DATED this 12th of January, 1988. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of 
January, 1988. 
J* < ~ 
Notary Publics--, 
•y.r-
Residing at: J -£ C „.,/ 
My commission expires: 
/# / /&/'$<? _ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
on the 12th day of January, 1988, to Ronald R. Stanger, Digitized by the How rd W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RONALD R. STANGER #3074 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
80 East 100 North 
P. 0. Box 477 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-5010 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERhOOD, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS U 
Plaintiff, AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
vs. VACATE 
T. DANIEL SHERtvOOD, 
Defendant. Civil No. 67254 
; / 
Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Ronald R. 
Stanger, hereby enters the following Memorandum of Points and 
Autnorities in ODDOSition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate. 
POINT I 
On O c t o b e r 2 2 , 1987 a CODV of t h e o r o u o s e d o r d e r 
r e g a r d i n g t h e O r a l Argumen t s h e l d on O c t o b e r 2, 1987 was s e n t 
a l o n g w i t h a c o v e r l e t t e r to Mr. De J o n g e r e a u e s t i n g t h a t he 
c o n t a c t P l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y i f he had any o b j e c t i o n s , 
s u g g e s t i o n s , or c o r r e c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the Drooosed Order. 
POINT I I 
De fendan t f i l e d an O b j e c t i o n t o t h e o r o u o s e d Orde r ; 
such Objec t ion was dated October 26, 1987. 
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POINT III 
On October 28, 1987 a cooy of the orooosed bindings of 
Fact and Conclusions ot Law and Second Amended Decree of 
Divorce was sent to Mr. De Jonge with a cover letter reauesting 
that he contact Plaintiff's attorney if there were any 
objections, suggestions or corrections. 
POINT IV 
The DroDOsed Order was delivered Co the Court tor 
signature, oursuant to Rule 2.9, on October 30, 1987. A CODV 
ot the cover letter to Judge Ballif was sent to Attorney De 
Jonge. 
POINT V 
Defendant tiled an Objection to the oroDosed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Decree or 
Divorce. Such Objection was dated November 12, 1987. 
POINT VI 
A resDonse to Defendants Objection was tiled by 
Plaintiff on November 18, 1987. 
POINT VIII 
The DroDOsed Findings ot Fact and Conclusions ,ot Law 
and Second Amended Decree of Divorce, oursuant to Rule 2.9, 
were submitted to the Court tor signature with a cooy or the 
cover letter to Judge Ballif being sent to Mr. De Jonge. 
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POINT IX 
On November 23, 1987 the Court entered its Ruling and 
signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second 
Amended Decree of Divorce. 
POINT X 
More than thirty (30) days have exDired since the 
judgment has been entered and therefore, the above court does 
not have jurisdiction in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
Based uDon such dates, DroDer notice was given urior to 
delivery to the Court, Dursuant to Rule 2.8, and the Court 
should not set oral arguments in this matter because it is the 
argument of Plaintiff that the Court can rule on this matter 
from the Memorandums filed and the file itself, 
1 9 8 8 . 
DATED t h i s / ^ ^ d a y of 
RONAUjy R / STANGER /) c — 
^ ' Attorney for Piaifrtitt 
Q 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of Che foregoing Memoranduni of Points and 
Authoricies in an envelooe, Dostage DreDaid, chis /y day 
of UiUbUi f , 1988 to: Mr. Nicolaas De Jonge, Attorney for Defendant, 5200 Highland Drive, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84117. 
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RONALD R. STANGER #3074 
Attorney tor Plaintiff 
80 East 100 North 
P. 0. Box 477 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-5010 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SYLVIA L. SHERWOOD, 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS h 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
vs. TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
VACATE 
T. DANIEL SHERWOOD, 
Defendant. Civil N o . 67254 
/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Ronald R. Stanger, being first duly sworn, ueooses and 
says as follows: 
1. That I am the attorney for the Piaintitt in the 
above-entitled matter. 
2. T h a t I am an a t t o r n e y l i c e n s e d to p r a c t i c e law in 
the State of Utah. 
3. That on O c t o b e r 22, 1987 I ca u s e d to have m a i l e d a 
coDy of the DroDOsed Order regarding the Oral Arguments held on 
O c t o b e r 2, 1987 along w i t h a c o v e r letter to M r . N i c o i a a s De 
J o n g e , a t t o r n e y tor D e t e n d a n t r e q u e s t i n g that it he had any 
objections, suggestions or corrections, to let me know. 
3-
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4. That on October 28, 1987 1 received a couy ot the 
Defendant's Objection to the Drooosed Order which was dated 
October 26, 1987. 
5. That on October 28, 1987 I caused to have mailed a 
coDy of the Drooosed Findings of Fact and Conclusions ot Law 
and Second Amended Decree of Divorce with a cover letter to Mr. 
Nicolaas De Jonge, Attorney tor Defendant, requesting that it 
he has any objections, suggestions, or corrections, to let me 
know. 
6. That on October 30, 1987 the Drooosed Order was 
delivered to the Court for signature with a cover letter dated 
October 29, 1987 to Judge Baiiif. A coDy of such letter was 
sent to Mr. De Jonge. 
7 • That on November 17, 1987 1 received the 
Defendant's Objection to the oroDOsed Findings ot tact and 
Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Decree ot Divorce dated 
November 12, 1987. 
8. That on November 18, 1987 Piaintitt tiiea a 
Response to Defendant's Objection to the Drooosed Findings ot 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Decree ot 
Divorce. On the same date, the Findings ot tact and 
Conclusions of Law and Second Amended Decree ot Divorce were 
submitted to the Court for signature with a cover letter to 
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Judge B a l l i f daced November 17, 1987; a cooy of such l e t t e r was 
s e n t to Mr. Nico laas De Jonge , A t to rney for Defendant . 
9. Tha t on November 2 3 , 1987 t h e Cour t e n t e r e d i t s 
R u l i n g and s i g n e d t h e F i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law 
and Second Amended Decree of Divorce . 
DATED t h i s fflG' day of ( Jfjj//AJLU. , 1988. 
/ /RONALD ^R. STANGER 
/ / ' A t t o r n e y for p l a i n t i f f 
"'' ~4*i-
SUBSCRIBED and StoORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s __l%^_ day of 
gfefty » 1988. 
Res id ing At : {QUUH} tff 
NOTARY PUBLIC " ' ^' 
My Commission ExDires: /£./}//%£ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
M a i l e d a c o p y of t h e f o r e g o i n g A f t i/da v i t in an 
e n v j e ^ l o D e , D o s t a g e D r e o a i d , t h i s __J$jz^__ d a y o f 
/Ufj/fA/J , 1988 t o : Mr. N i c o l a a s De J o n g e , 
A t t o r n e y ipf D e f e n d a n t , 5200 H i g h l a n d D r i v e , S u i t e 300, S a l t 
Lake C i t y , UT 84117. 
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arrow. I think that is sufficient. 
Q. And then your car payment is $237? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you have automobile expenses of 
$1 78? 
Yes . 
Q. What's this credit union loan of $35? 
A. It's a loan that I took out for the truck 
that I owned which was a 1978 truck and I had to 
take a loan out because the motor blew up. 
Q. And then you have a protection bank card 
of $94? 
jt\ • v o O • 
Q. Well, you have a 94 and a 35 you will 
have to explain to me. 
A. The $94 is for the loan at Geneva Credit 
Union, the second loan. And the $90 is for medical 
bills. It says medical there. 
Q. No, ma'am. I am sorry. I am talking 
about these two items down here. The last two 
i terns. 
A. The $94 for the credit union loan and the 
other one was the protection bank card for $35 a 
month. 
Q, Now, these are all debts that you have 
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incurred subsequent to your divorce; is that 
: o r r e c t ? 
A 
Q . 
A . 
Yes . 
Including the car? 
Yes , I had to have the car. 
Q. Now, how much child support is Mr. 
Sherwood been paying? 
A. $200. 
Q. And he is only required to pay $190? 
A. Right. Isn't it a fact that Mr. Sherwood 
has been paying all of the child's medical expenses? 
A. That was in the divorce Decree. 
Q. 
A . 
Q • 
A . 
Well, my question is --
Yes 
has he been paying it? 
Yes 
Q . And the child has been covered by 
insurance? 
A. His insurance, I guess. 
Q. Don't you have insurance? 
A. But she is not on my insurance. 
Q. She is not on your insurance? 
A. No, she is not. 
Q. Is that coverage available for her? 
A. Yes, it is but the divorce Decree says he 
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is responsible for her and that's why it is that 
v, a j -
Q. My question is, Is it available to her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would it cost you anything? 
A. Yes, it would. No, not for the 
insurance. Yes, for the deductibles for the 
medication for the office visits, if she got hurt, 
emergency. It would all cost, you bet. 
Q. But to put her on your insurance plan 
would not cost you any money? 
A. No 
Q. Yet you failed to put her on? 
A. There can't be two people having 
insurance on one person and since he had insurance 
on her there was no reason for me to put insurance 
on her. 
Q. And if the case were to come about and 
that's in fact the way it is, if Mr. Sherwood 
doesn't have insurance v/ould you be willing to put 
her on your insurance? 
A. No, because he is responsible for her 
welfare. He makes a lot more than I do. 
Q. Are you saying that even if it's 
absolutely free of charge to you, you would not be 
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willing to put her on? 
A. It is not absolutely free of charge., 
though. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because I have to pay the deductible 
q. What if you didn't have to pay the 
deductibles, then would you put her on your 
insurance? 
A . 
Q. 
A . 
No . 
Why not? 
Because it is his responsibility. 
THE COURT: You have an answer from her 
on that, Counsel. 
MR. DE JONGE: Your Honor, I am at a 
little bit of a loss as to which of these have been 
received. 
THE COURT: Nine through 12. 
MR. DE JONGE: Nine, 10, 11 and 12 I have 
here and I would ask that those be admitted. 
THE COURT: They will be admitted. 
MR. DE JONGE: And I am assuming that 
everything prior to that time has been received. 
THE COURT: What is 12? 
MR. DE JONGE: Twelve, Your Honor., are 
the Mountain Fuel checks, if I may. 
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will question him concerning that. Your Honor, I 
would. I am sorry. Those allegations that are in 
that custody evaluation I really feel like Mr. 
Sherwood ought to be given an opportunity to at 
least on the record to deny those things. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Why don't you take the stand, Mr. 
Sherwood. Let Mr. Stanger lay his foundation on 
those exhibits and then you can handle everything 
you will have at the same time. 
MR. DE JONGE: Alright. Thank you. 
DANIEL SHERWOOD, having been previously 
called as a witness, and having been previously 
first duly sworn to tell the truth, was recalled as 
a witness and continued to testify as follows: 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
EY MR. STANGER: 
Q. Let me hand to you what has been marked 
as proposed Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 13 and would you 
could you identify those for the Court, please? 
A. They are my bank statements from 
Commercial Security Bank. 
Q. And I can represent to you and we have 
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MR. STANGER: Y e s , s i r . 
My net income? 
No, gross. 
Before business deductions or after 
:% 
business deductions? 
Q. Well, it's always a difficult question to 
ask when you are in business for yourself. 
A- I believe after business deductions 
$18,000. I believe it was 17,900 some odd dollars. 
Q And you are a certified public 
accountant? 
A. Yes, Tarn. 
Q. And you can help me out because you are 
good at figures. We have prorated that out in 1986 
and your deposits would come to $83,320 based upon 
that is our figuring. And are you telling the Court 
that out of the $83,000 that your gross income is 
$ 1 7 , 0 0 0 ? 
MR. DE J0NGE: Perhaps counsel can tell 
us where the 83 came from. That caught me by 
surprise. 
MR. STANGER: Thank you- What we did is 
just assuming there were the same deposits from that 
point on because it only covered so many months and 
prorating — 
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figure:; on the record. 
THE COURT: I would like something 
helpful to me. What T have heard so far is not 
terribly helpful. 
MR. STANGER: Let me have that Exhibit 
for just a minute. So that we kind of go through 
this. 
THE COURT: Why don't you consult with 
Mr. --
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 was marked for 
identification.) 
MR. STANGER: The name of the account at 
top is T. Dan Sherwood. 
Q . Let me hand you what has been marked as 
proposed Exhibit No. 14. Is that the same account? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Let me ask you one question now. I have 
gone through that account and I want to see if you 
disagree with this. There are cash checks made or 
' !»'•• I'• • m . i i l f m i l tfi f;ir;h t h , t t e?xc;f;fMl $ 5 , 0 0 0 ? 
/ h I -j* » 
' i < *. < 11 7 < i ii < / j i l • I n I I i. * \ 1111' •##*'/ 
A I pay a]l of my gas. oil and repairs, 
majority of it. There is a few checks in there for 
thor;o items, entertainment and travel with cash. 
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Q, Can T call your attention to the various 
checks you have may out to Nimos? 
A . They are a private club that you can have 
dinner there or dinner and dance. 
0 . That would be entertainment also? 
A. Entertainment, personal entertainment. 
Q So you pay by cash and checks? 
A Correct 
Q Is that amount deducted in your judgment 
from what we call a gross income or the deposits? 
A. Only the portion that is business 
related 
. Q. And let me see what you have. That might 
shorten up some time, too. 
MR. STANGER: Let's have it marked. 
Let's have it introduced because we want everything 
b o fore? the Court. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 15 was marked for 
identification. ) 
MR. DE JONGE: Your Honor, may I do a 
little housekeeping and then maybe we can get some 
of the stuff out of the way? 
MR. STANGER: I presume you have a copy 
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THE COURT: Fourteen? 
MR. STANGER: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: What was Exhibit 15? 
MR. STANGER: Calls it cash register 
receipts r e oo n c i1 iation. 
THE COURT: That's 15? 
MR. STANGER: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Still don't have 14 here. 
MR. STANGER: Fourteen are copies of the 
checks themselves that were supplied to us by 
discover y .. 
Q. 
t hi nk of 
A . 
Q 
it? 
There is one final question that I can 
Do you have an automobile? 
Yes, T do. 
And what kind is it and when did you buy 
A. T bought it December 9th, 1986. 
Q. What type is it? 
A. It's a BMW. 
Q. And how much did you pay for it and how 
did you pay for it? 
A. Tt was $21,500. I paid $898 down 
payment, $400 a month for four years and then a 
balloon payment of about $12 ..000 or $11,000. 
Q And I think you started to answer that on 
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2 1 
2 4 
yuur schedule but I don't think I let you answer it 
or* something happened. You sold a house in American 
F o r k ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you received approximately $1,000 a 
year from that? 
A. I receive $ 114 a month, yes. 
Q. A little bit more than that? 
A $1,300. 
MR. STANGER: Thank you very much. Your 
H o n a v . 
THE COURT: Go ahead Mr. DeJonge. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DE JONGE: 
0. Now, with regard to the car, why did you 
p u r c h a s e a new car? 
A. The engine in my other car was an f84. 
Car blew out. It was ruined. 
Q. And you use this car for your business? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q. The house in American Fork, you say the 
monthly payments you receive are how much? 
A. Well, the total monthly payments is $328 
a month of w h i c h $ 214 a month is paid directly to 
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19 8 4. correct? 
A . Right. 
Q. And at tht: time o f thn d I vu v c: t: presumably 
the issue of support and/or t hi e issue of child 
support and alimony came up; is that correct? 
A . Correct. 
Q. And as a consequence the issue of your 
income was presented to the Court; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 17 was marked for 
ident i fication. ) 
Q. T show you what's been marked proposed 
17. Can you tell the court what that document 
represents? 
A. It's my 1983 tax return. 
Q. Now, at the time of the divorce, is that 
the tax return that was used in determining your 
income for purposes of child support and alimony? 
A. Yes. i t i s . 
Q. And what business income does that tax 
return reflect? 
A . $10,761.86. 
Q. Now, so it would be your testimony then 
that for calendar year 1983 your total income from 
your business was $10,761? 
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A. Right. 
0. Now. hi as your business financial 
activities ever been reviewed by the Internal 
R e venue Service? 
A. No, they haven't, 
Q. Are these tax returns prepared by you? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q . Are they prepared in accordance with the 
rules of the Internal Revenue Service, etc.? 
A . Yes . 
MR. DE JONGE: Your Honor, I would move 
for the admission of 17. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
Q. Now, previously counsel put into evidence 
a tax return for calendar year 1986. Do you recall 
t h a t ? 
A. Right. 
Q. And is it your testimony that that tax 
return accurately reflects your income from your 
business for that year? 
A. Y e s , i t does . 
Q. Now, on that tax return there is an item 
called interest income $3,859. Would you tell the 
Court wha t that is for? 
T ha t is the inter e s t received on t h e 
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Q What are you paying, what's your 
obligation for calendar year 1986 for alimony? 
A. Right at the present I am supposed to be 
paying $226 a month. T was supposed to pay her auto 
insurance of approximately $160.65 every three 
months. I am liable to pay her federal and state 
income taxes not to exceed $800 per annum and seems 
like there was one other. 
Q. Wow, those amounts are not reflected on 
your tax return., are they? 
A. No, they are not. 
Q So. Mr. Sherwood, would it be accurate to 
say that looking at your tax return your total 
income for 1986 is $18,000? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And your total income for 1983 would be 
about $10,700? 
A. Yes, i t was. 
Q. Now, Mr. Sherwood, at the time of your 
divorce you presented the court with an Affidavit 
and that Affidavit contained a statement regarding 
your monthly draw at that time and it also included 
a statement of your monthly expenses at that time; 
is that correct? 
A. Correct, yes. 
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Security Bank. The second one is an account with Fakler 
Tires. And the third one is with Macey Jewelers. And the 
fourth one is with Sears Roebuck. 
Q Now, taking the first one, the Equaline with 
Commercial Security Bank, what is the unpaid balance on that 
particular obligation? 
A Forty-nine thousand nine hundred fifty-four 
dollars and twenty-one cents. 
Q And that is a line of credit, isn't that correct? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And what is the purpose, and what has been the 
purpose for that particular line of credit? 
A Part of the money has gone into the business, and 
the balance has been to live on. 
Q And at the time of the divorce, do you have any 
knowledge or recollection as to how much that line of credit 
was? 
A Thirty-five thousand. 
Q So that line of credit has increased approx-
imately $15,000.00? 
A Yes, it has. 
Q And you indicate that that increase has either 
gone into the business or been used for your living expenses? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, would part of that increase be reflected 
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1 A The ring for my wife. 
2 Q That is the wedding ring that you purchased? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q And you're still making monthly payments on that 
5 ring? 
6 A Yes/ I am. 
7 Q And does that statement accurately reflect the 
8 unpaid balance? 
9 A Yes/ it does. 
10 I Q I would ask you to turn to the next statement 
11 that you have. Could you identify that one for the Court/ 
12 please? 
13 A Sears Roebuck. 
14 Q And what is the unpaid balance on that statement? 
15 A One twenty sixty-six. 
16 Q And does that statement accurately reflect the 
17 amount that is due and owning to Sears? 
18 A Yes/ it does. 
19 MR. DE JONGE: May the record reflect that I did 
20 give Counsel copies of those? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. Fine. 
22 Q (By Mr. DeJonge) And you are still making 
23 monthly payments on that particular obligation? 
24 A Yes/ I am. 
25 (Defendants Exhibits 31 and 32 were marked for 
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is re 
year? 
A 
Q 
flee 
A 
Well/ it starts out with 
—First of all/ if I may/ 
:ted on your personal income 
The total income is eight 
dollars and ninety-eight cents. 
Q Now/ this Reconciliation 
deposits— 
what is the income that 
tax on that calendar 
een thousand forty-four 
that you have prepared/ 
was prepared in conjunction with those deposit slips that 
were 
slips 
presented here yesterday/ isn't 
A 
Q 
Correct. 
And isn't it also correct 
that were made to your personal 
a portion 
A 
Q 
in fact/ 
1986? 
then/ 
1986 
total 
A 
Q 
is 
part 
A 
Q 
i of the calendar year 1986? 
Correct. 
that correct? 
that those deposit 
account were only for 
And that the Reconciliation that you have there/ 
takes into consideration the 
Correct. 
entire calendar year 
All right. So what we are essentially doing/ 
adding to the information th 
.ial year deposit slips? 
Correct. 
Now/ with that framework 
deposits to your personal check 
calendar year 1986 pursuant to that e 
at is displayed by those 
in mind/ what were the 
ing account for the 
xhibit? 
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A Eighty-one thousand seven hundred and thirty 
dollars forty-one cents. 
Q 
deposits? 
A 
Q 
Where did 
A 
And the ba 
Okay. Now, what were the sources of those 
Loans. 
In other words, where did those funds come from? 
that money actually come from? 
Well, a portion of it came from the business. 
lance, about $17,000.00 worth actually came from 
the business. The balance is from loans. 
Q Now, you've indicated on your exhibit that some 
of those deposits came from the business and some from the 
loans. If 
the items 
of $5,000. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Commercial 
A 
Q 
ago? 
A 
Q 
I look at my copy of Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, would 
called, for instance, VISA Commercial Security Bank 
00, what would that represent? 
That would be advances on a check guarantee card. 
That has been deposited to your personal account? 
Yes. 
For example, if I go to the item called "Loan, 
Security Bank," what would that represent? 
That was the loan on June 6th, 1986. 
That's the one we just referred to a few moments 
Yes. 
And that was just strictly a loan of money which | 
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1 was deposited to your account? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q If I go to "Loan/ Commercial Security Bank, 
4 Equaline/" what would that represent? 
5 A That's loans on my credit line that was 
6 deposited. 
7 Q So all of these adjustments/ then/ to the 
8 deposits were all monies that were borrowed/ is that 
9 correct? 
10 A Yes. Correct. 
11 Q And the eighty-one thousand seven hundred and 
12 thirty dollars/ most of those monies came from the 
13 generation of revenues from the business/ is that correct? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Now, going down to the next category of numbers/ 
16 what do those categories of numbers represent? 
17 A The business expenses that I paid out of my 
18 personal checking account. 
19 Q These are all legitimate business expenses? 
20 A Yes/ they are. 
21 Q These business expenses/ are they all reflected 
22 on your 1986 income tax returns? 
23 A Yes, they are. 
24 Q And they are/ in fact/ part of your income tax 
25 returns for the calendar year 1986 in determining what your 
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A Well/ there is insurance payments 
my wife some insurance on her automobile. 
Q Now, does your first wife have th 
it the second wife? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
The second wife. 
You have been married three times 
This is my third time/ yes. 
Or have you been married a fourth 
No, this is the third time. 
I'm just trying to get it clear. 
married once before you married Sylvia? 
A 
Q 
question/ 
Right. 
in here paying 
e child or is 
? 
time? 
You were 
Fine. Now, I think you have answered my 
but if you go through there/ there 
of any type or nature/ except for insurance? 
a fair statement? 
A 
Q 
the Court 
rent/ you 
A 
Correct. And child support. 
Secondly/ would you also show to 
an illustration of the payments of 
are no payments 
Would that be 
me or show to 
the business 
know, the money that you pay on your CPA practice? 
That's paid out of a checking account with Valley 
Bank & Trust in the name of H. Sherwood & Company for the 
Salt Lake 
Q 
A 
Office. 
So you do have another account? 
That is not mine. 
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at that time? 
A I had a 1978 Chev Truck. 
Q But basically/ you drive one vehicle both for 
business/ and I'll call it a car that you also drive for non-
business purposes? Is that the same car? 
A Right. 
Q Now/ let me see if I might speed things up a 
little bit. Could you show us anything that would be over 
fifty dollars? 
A That's what I'm looking for. There's some wages 
that I paid out in December/ but these are not in order. 
If I may/ I've got a breakdown— 
Q —Well/ I want to see a check. 
A I can refer to a check number/ and then maybe 
I can find it a lot easier. Check No. 1553 to 
Jane Peterson was a Christmas bonus of $200.00. 
Q All right. Can you recall anything other than 
the two hundred and thirteen dollars taken out of your 
"personal account/" we'll call it? 
A All of my gas and oil/ but that was paid for by 
cash, though. There's over $2/000.00 on that. And then 
entertainment is $3/000.00 
Q The cash that we added up came to a total of six 
checks written to cash was for $5/500.00. Would that be 
accurate? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 sixty thousand if we add the two of them together? 
2 A But you have checks going back and forth. 
3 Q I understand that. 
4 A Yes/ of the gross deposits, yes. 
5 Q Now, is there anything else that you wanted to 
6 say in response to my question? I don't want to cut you off 
7 A No. 
8 I Q Thank you very much. Now, on the business 
9 account, H. Sherwood & Company, who signs those checks. 
10 A I can sign on them, but I sign very, very few 
11 of them. Jane Peterson issues all of the checks. 
12 Q Isn't she, basically, your secretary? 
13 A Yes, she is. 
14 Q And she does what you tell her to do? 
15 A Well, she receives all of the monthly bills and 
16 sends them out. 
17 Q And that's under your supervision and instruction 
18 to pay the bills, and she does the things she is told like 
19 the rest of us that are in private practice? 
20 A Right. 
21 Q Do you have a judgment in your own mind as an 
22 Accountant, the same as I'm a Lawyer, and we go to the 
23 seminars and we have our own experiences—maybe I should ask 
24
 a piTivious question to that. How long have you been a CPA? 
25 A For about probably seven or eight years. I'm 
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Q And that was the Balance Sheet that you tried to 
find for us today? 
A Yes. 
Q And as an Accountant, you didn't keep a copy of 
that? 
A The only thing I keep is a- Closing Statement. 
Q But you did not keep a copy of the Balance Sheet?) 
A No. 
Q Now, if the Court requested or if anybody 
requested a copy of the Balance Sheets would it be any 
different than the Balance Sheet that you have prepared and 
given to the Judge today showing basically, I think, about 
seventeen or eighteen thousand dollars income? 
A As far as the income, there shouldn't be any 
difference, whatsoever. The returns were prepared and given 
to him. 
Q Has it been your experience that the bank will 
loan $50,000.00 when people earn between ten and seventeen 
or eighteen thousand dollars? 
A They required me to give them projections for 
the next year. 
Q And is that a projection into this year, or am 
I off a year? 
A You're off a year. 
Q It was two years ago? 
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A 
Q 
Q 
a day 
unders 
It was for '85 and included '86. 
Do you recall what your projections were? 
I projected that it would go up significantly/ 
•t. 
Did you project that the deposits would be more 
ndred and sixty thousand dollars? 
No. 
I realize some of those might have been loans. 
Now, I want to make certain of this/ because it's 
and a half/ and it doesn't seem very long/ but 
tand/ at the time of the previous 
represented to the Court that you had a i 
about $10/000.00? Was that your testimony? 
taki 
$18, 
A 
Q 
ng abou 
A 
Q 
000.00, 
A 
Q 
No/ it was a negative of $19/000 
Divorce Degree/ 
let income of 
.00. 
Your Attorney talked about net assets/ and I'm 
t income. 
Okay. Yes. 
And now it's about double that? 
is that right? 
Yes. 
It's now about 
And so at the time that you represented to this 
Court previously that you had that amount of 
payi 
doll 
ng Sylvia a total amount of five hundred 
ars/ roughly? 
A Correct. 
income/ you were 
and fifty 
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Q You were paying three hundred and fifty alimony 
and $200.00 child support. I think it was a hundred and 
ninety or a hundred and ninety-nine dollars/ I don't remember 
now, but something like that? 
A I was paying five fifty a month. 
Q But I think you paid that? 
A Yes. 
Q And/ at the present time/ as I understand it/ 
you're making over $18,000.00? 
A Right. 
A You're now paying Sylvia $200.00? 
A Correct. 
Q Do you, of your own knowledge know that Sylvia 
is paying three hundred and twelve dollars a month just for 
child care? 
A I didn't know that until I seen it represented 
on her Financial Disclosure Statement. 
Q Hasn't she, in fact/ talked to you about that? 
A No, she had not. 
Q Now, you are married now, is that correct? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q And what is the name of your current wife? 
A Catherine. 
Q Is she employed? 
A Part time. 
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1 A Yes/ we did. 
2 I Q Where did you go? 
a I A To San Carlos in Mexico. 
4 I Q You went to "Mexico." Did you pay for that? 
c A Can I explain? 
g Q Did you borrow the money? 
7 A No. We drove to San Carlos. We stayed in a 
8 residence owned by an individual in Greeley/ Colorado. So 
9 the only thing that cost us was the gas and the food and two 
nights in a hotel room. 
Q But whatever other expenses you had/ you had 
sufficient funds to pay for them/ I take it? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, you have also provided the Court with a copy 
of buying a BMW which has a current balance, as I recall/ 
of about $22/000.00? 
A Correct. 
Q And when I say "current," I mean at the time you 
borrowed the money? 
A Correct. 
Q Did you provide them with a Balance Sheet? 
A I provided them with a loan application. As I 
recall/ it's been about six months. But they sent out for 
a credit application/ and they sent my application to General 
Electric Corp., and they said because of my current debt load 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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they would not carry it/ so it was dropped back to Legacy 
Financial and they felt good about it because of the credit 
app./ and they gave me the car. 
Q And/ obviously/ you cleared your credit and loan 
and they loaned the money to you for the car? 
A Right. 
Q And you are current in your payments to them? 
A Yes/ I am. 
Q What are the monthly payments on that car/ again? 
A Four hundred dollars a month. The previous one 
was four eighty-five. 
Q Since we have received the documents that you 
reviewed, the deposits and the checks, has there been 
anything unsual happen between that time and the current 
time/ or would those documents we have reviewed pretty-much 
reflect what the deposits and the spending would be? 
A The deposits/ I believe/ have gone down. But 
I'm not positive. 
Q Do you have any judgment, in your mind/ what your 
deposits have been for the last few months? I don't recall 
the last date of those deposits. 
A Those were December. It would probably be, not 
counting the checks back into the office/ it would be 
$3,000.00 a month/ with the exception of January when eight 
days after I purchased the car it was vandalized and I 
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1 received a check from the insurance company of almost 
2 $3,000-00 extra. 
3 Q Would that $3/000.00 be in your personal account 
4 or your professional account? 
5 A It went into my personal account. 
6 I Q And how much would be in your professional 
7 account during that period of time? 
8 A January through April 15th is my busiest 
9 time of the year, and that's where the majority of my income 
10 comes from. The rest of the year it's break even. 
11 I Q so what is your answer? I'm sorry. 
12 A January through April 15th is the busiest time 
13 of the year and that's where the majority of my income comes 
14 from. During those months. And then the rest of the year 
15 it's just enough to just barely get by on. There's no extra 
16 Q Gould you give me a figure? 
17 A I would say probably for the first six months, 
18
 somewhere in the neighborhood of $50,000.00. 
19 Q And that would be money put in the business 
20 account? 
21 A Correct. 
22 Q DO you rent, or are you buying your office? 
23 A Rent. 
24 Q And who do you rent from? Is it a relative, or 
25 anybody like that? 
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Currently/ yes. 
How much is that costing your? 
Currently it's nothing. 
And that is medical insurance provided by whom? 
By my father's office as a group policy. 
Does he pay for it? 
Yes/ he does. 
And how much is he paying? 
I think a little over a hundred dollars a month. 
And you are presently paying Sylvia Sherwood 
Yes. 
And in addition/ you're paying the child's 
sxpenses? 
Right. 
Do you have any testimony today as to how much 
paid out of pocket this year for those medical 
p 
For 1987? 
Yes sir. All medical expenses? 
"All medical expenses/" it runs on the average 
a hundred dollars a month/ I would guess. 
For medical expenses? 
Yes. 
You earlier testified when Mr. Stanger asked you 
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Advance Report 38, your Honor. The guideline that the 
Supreme Court there upheld from the previous Supreme Court 
case talks about relative disparity. And they talk about 
relative disparity of income at the time of the divorce and 
relative disparity of income at the time of the hearing. 
And if the Court will look at the evidence and look at the 
information that has been presented in writing where we have 
went to all the trouble we have/ you will see the relative 
disparity/ and if it is a change at all/ your Honor/ it has 
been a change in favor of Mrs. Sherwood/ not in favor of 
Mr. Sherwood. 
The fact of the matter is, at the time of the 
divorce Mr. Sherwood's income was around $900.00 per month. 
His 1986 income tax returns indicates his income to be 
$1600.00 per month. That is an increase. 
However, at the time of the divorce/ 
Mrs. Sherwood's income/ if we look at 1983, was two hundred 
and sixty-two dollars per month. If we look at 1984, her 
income is five hundred and thirty-eight dollars per month. 
And for the calendar year 1986 her income has jumped to 
fourteen hundred and twenty-one dollars per month. So I 
submit, your Honor, she had had a substantial increase in 
income. 
And I would also submit/ your Honor/ that my 
client's net worth during the same period of time has 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
1 the debt that is going up/ too. And that's really the 
2 essence of the case. 
3 MR. DE JONGE: That's correct. And that's why. 
4 I'm so concerned about this Finding, Judge. 
5 THE COURT: Well/ take it to the Supreme Court 
6 and you can attack whatever Finding you have/ and they may 
7 say you are supported by that conclusion. 
8 MR. DE JONGE: I would hope that maybe I could 
9 convince this Court so he wouldn't be inclined to go through 
10 that remedy. 
11 THE COURT: I have considered this matter very 
12 deeply and with a high degree of seriousness, Mr. De Jonge, 
13 and I heard your arguments and you were really eloquent and 
14 persuasive/ and you're a fine Lawyer/ and you represented 
15 your client's position very well. 
16 I So I think your specific objection to that 
17 Finding isn't well taken. I don't think in it I'm doing what 
18 you say. It may be that I'm doing something about not aging 
19 anything, but I'm not looking at it to age anything. I'm 
20 looking at what he's doing and what he has in that Finding. 
21 Is there anything else in any of the other items? 
22 MR. DE JONGE: Yes sir. With respect to Finding 
23 No. 9 it is certainly true/ your Honor/ that Mr. Sherwood's 
24 tax returns are before the Court and are in evidence/ 
25 indicating the amount of gross income that he had for the 
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1 purchased a new automobile is because his other one blew up 
2 and he needed the transportation. 
3 I would also point out/ and I think the Gale case 
4 that I cited to the Court/ indicates that the Court has a 
5 responsibility to look at the relative disparity of the 
6 income between the parties. 
7 The disparity of the income at the time of the 
8 divorce versus the disparity of the income today. 
9 And I submit, your Honor/ that today 
10 Mrs. Sherwood makes more money than Mr. Sherwood. 
11 The tax returns so reflect and her income so 
12 reflects. And I simply request the Court to correct the 
13 Decision that it rendered in this matter. 
14 I think that to require Mr. Sherwood to pay 
15 $390.00 per month is a burden that he simply cannot bear. 
16 And the fact of the matter is, your Honor/ that the evidence 
17 presented here at the trial just simply does not bear out 
18 an award of $390.00 per month and an increase in child supportj 
19 in excess of a hundred percent. And we would seriously and 
20 earnestly ask the Court to reconsider this matter. 
21 In addition/ your Honor/ we presented evidence 
22 at the time of trial relating to the insurance issue. 
23 Mrs. Sherwood has insurance available at her employment. 
24 she just absolutely refuses to use it. The Court didn't make 
25 a ruling on that. 
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1 wanted to refresh your memory that there were other issues. 
2 THE COURT: That is the key issue in this case 
3 that you're going to have to justify here/ and that is 
4 whether or not there has been a material change of circum-
5 stance. I think the evidence is there. I think it has come 
6 from both from the standpoint of his earnings. There may 
7 be a wash there as far as percentage-wise. 
8 But I think when you look at the total of what 
9 is coming in from the standpoint of income from the stand-
10 point of credit worthiness and all of those things/ I think 
11 all of those things have got to be considered in determining 
12 whether there has been a material change of circustances/ 
13 and that's what jumped out at me in this case. 
14 MR. STANGER: Yes sir. I understand. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you very much. We'll be in 
16 recess. 
1? (Whereupon/ this Hearing was concluded at 9:50 
18 A . M . ) 
19 I — o o O o o — 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 the wife signs a waiver each and every year—maybe I 
2 shouldnft say "the wife," but the custodial parent/ she gets 
3 the tax deduction. I think that's the change in the new tax 
4 law. 
5 THE COURT: I don't really know. 
5 MR. DE JONGE: May I just comment on that/ Judge?| 
7 MR. STANGER: That's what I've been told. 
8 . MR. DE JONGE: And I don't think that's incorrect. 
9 I think the custodial parent does have to sign a document. 
All I'm saying is that the court order can provide that if 
he is current on his child support/ that she be required to 
sign that document. And I think that's what I'm coming from. 
MR. STANGER: I understand your position. I have] 
14 | already discussed my position to the Court/ but I want to 
15 remind the Court/ as I understand/ after reading the 
16 documents/ this was never raised in any of the pleadings or 
17 in the Petition or in the Counterpetition/ and so I don't 
18 think it was before the Court. 
19 THE COURT: As far as who would claim the child 
20 as a tax deduction? 
21 MR. STANGER: As far as a tax deduction and the 
22 medical insurance. As I recall/ and I think Counsel has been) 
23 very articulate in presenting his client's position/ and I 
24 also compliment him on that/ but the point is/ if I were to 
25 recall/ and I certainly don't know that I can recall it 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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